On Being a ‘Conspiracy Theorist'

[working draft — copyright 1999 —
disseminate with permission only — comments welcome]

In America today politics and politicians are not very popular. Men and women are routinely elected to office, high and low, by 20 to 25 percent of the eligible voters—sometimes less, seldom more. Observers from the left and right tend to agree that Americans are politically alienated—having lost, for various reasons, confidence in the government and the electoral process. A substantial number of Americans, some two-thirds, view the government as "run by a few big interests looking out for themselves." [1] Those ‘fat cats' in Washington, those millionaire senators, ‘you can't fight city hall,' ‘Gucci gulch' lobbyists—these are four examples of the cynicism underlying citizen conviction that special interests benefit at the expense of ‘the people.'

Despite the widespread frustration with politics and government, most normal people do not subscribe to a conspiracy view that says high-placed members of a secret government run the country. Nor are they familiar with C. Wright Mills' ‘power elite'—a loosely organized (mostly unorganized) cohort of like-minded persons who make decisions (take actions) that benefit their own interests. Thus the more extreme idea that—taking numbers out of the air—300 to 5,000 [2] persons on the planet actively collaborate to achieve mutually agreed upon ends is viewed by most as ‘loony tunes'—and pity the poor, sick mind who would entertain such a thought.

What Are Conspiracy Theorists Saying?

The balanced, thorough conspiracy theorist ‘knows' that 99 percent of ‘reality' is ordinary, messy, confused, everyday life. Even those relative few in the power elite thought to be most active in conspiracy are acknowledged to be ‘human,' fallible, often motivated by high ideals, and persons of high esteem—both self- and by others. This said, the better conspiracy theorists think that a relatively few men and women of power are basically sociopaths, regardless of their public image.

When George Bush was in office, the better conspiracy theorists saw him—no matter how evil—as a man, struggling in office with the inherent contradictions of the American political system. While he was seen as somewhat more in control of his and others' destiny than perhaps anyone on the planet, he was not omnipotent. For example, his ‘floating' of the New World Order met stiff resistance—from left, right, and center. The kinder conspiracy theorists acknowledged Bush's physical illnesses and frailties and that Bush saw himself as a decent, highly self-confident individual struggling on behalf of mankind. Those taking a negative view feared the worst. Bush's past exploits in the CIA and as a member of the Reagan administration marked him as inherently untrustworthy. They thought that Bush might even resort to martial law to remain in power if he thought he would not be reelected. [3]

In short, conspiracy theorists do not automatically and crudely say that sociopaths get together and say: "Screw the world. We've got ours, and we know how to twist people so that we can get theirs while protecting our own kith and ken." Instead, most ‘conspirators' are acknowledged to lead relatively normal lives—sleeping, eating, and recreating ‘just like the rest of us.' While they are thought to be privy to secrets (protected in the name of national security, learned through involvement in ‘clubs,' major corporations, and other centers of power), they are not viewed as superpersons. Even when some historical continuity to the conspiracy is assumed, the conspirators seldom are viewed as members of all-powerful cults or secret societies. They cannot wave a magic wand and make ‘just anything' happen. Similarly, they must deal with complex realities, such as the federal government or the annual budget, and the process is laborious for anyone, conspiracy or not. [4]

Conspiracy theorists whose ‘paranoia quotient' is still in check—who may be seen as cynical-but-healthy—realize that all ‘sane' humans live primarily in the context of normalcy. [5] ‘Normalcy' is at the heart of sociology and psychology. Further, the ordinary world is extraordinarily rich, diverse, and complex. Perhaps nothing human is simple. Whether in rural Pakistan or in the banking and legal canyons of Wall Street, dozens of major forces work on the individual, against a backdrop of hundreds/thousands of variables. Leaders in and out of government, conspirators or not, spend the overwhelming majority of their time dealing with this complex everyday reality. Certainly political ‘reality' is not a simple matter of a few humans pulling the strings and the millions performing in lock-step a choreographed system of political parties, voting, and checked-and-balanced government. That is, the dominant, mainstream institutions have a momentum and structure of their own.

Anyone who tries to ignore the trends/forces of this complex reality is likely to end up on the street or dead. [6] Even Adolf Hitler, who was insane and who conspired with fellow Germans as well as international figures, lived most of his daily life within the context of normalcy—otherwise he could not have functioned and no one would have listened to him. The patina of normalcy covers society like a film of lies—acknowledged by everyone—even the walking-around insane—as convenient regularities that enable orderly and reasonable social interaction. [7]

Some writers, such as Manly P. Hall [8], claim that there exists an interwoven stream of secret societies, going back thousands of years, that are highly egalitarian, and that have remained hidden because the dominant ‘reality' has been anti-egalitarian. They say the church, economic institutions, and political powers have been against ‘utopian' ideals since long before Christ, making the introduction of modern democracy impossible until 1776. America is the great experiment, so the argument goes, to see if the people are up to the task of self-governance. This test has taken place in the face of many obstacles (Native American resistance, foreign aggression, Communism, economic cycles, stubborn religious forces, etc.). Hall does not see the experiment as either over or highly successful. He posits institutional reasons for the partial failure, as well as notes both pro- and anti-democratic conspirators struggling for power. [9]

Given that by themselves invidious assumptions and double-edged laws do not prove conspiracy, nor does ignorance, incompetence, and greed, nor even past acknowledged conspiracies, then what is the best empirical evidence? Simply that often enough leaders admit to various forms of conspiracy—usually based on the public good. ‘National Security' is the umbrella justification for CIA-type conspiracies, which cover a broad range of domestic and foreign secret operations. [10] Also, leaders often admit to ‘harmless' secret meetings based on their Constitutional right to freedom of assembly (and association), which are ‘none of our damned business.' ‘Private clubs' are said to be benign associations of like-minded men and women. The Bilderbergers, men's clubs, and the Bohemian Grove are self-proclaimed ‘private' organizations. Secret societies from the Masons and Order of Malta through the Jesuits to multinational corporations are examples of formal organizations in which secret meetings and planning occur. Somewhat ‘public' organizations include the Club of Rome, the Trilateral Commission, and the Council of Foreign Relations, which publish reports and list employees and prominent affiliates, but which also conduct private meetings.

Conspiracy theorists would agree that purely social gatherings of individuals, even ‘birds of a feather,' might not be of great importance. The question is: What is discussed and how much ‘business' gets done at these ‘private' (euphemism for ‘secret') meetings? Most (almost all) of the content of discussions by top leaders of such organizations is secret, yet there is very little proof that any actions taken are illegal. There are very few ‘smoking guns.' When occasionally such evidence is found, soon a mountain of contradictory data appears, ‘proving' that the illegal action is not clear-cut or, as in the case of certain assassinations, discrediting the evidence itself. Recent examples include Iran-Contra, the October Surprise, the use of the BCCI by U.S. intelligence agencies, the luring of Saddam Hussein into occupying Kuwait, and the S&L debacle (extending into Congress and throughout the Reagan-Bush administration). [11]

Michael Albert, Daniel Brandt, Carroll Quigley, and Bill Clinton

Michael Albert

Albert addresses conspiracy theory by comparing it to institutional theory. He observes left and right progressive and fascist advocates for both theories. His main concern is left/progressive conspiracy and institutional theories. "A conspiracy theory is a hypothesis that some events were caused by the secret machinations of undemocratic individuals." [12] By contrast:

In an institutional theory, personalities and personal motives enter the discussion only as results of more basic factors. The personal actions culminating in some event do not serve as explanation. The theory explains phenomena via the roles, incentives, and dynamics of underlying institutions. An institutional theory doesn't ignore human actions, but the point of an institutional explanation is to move from personal factors to institutional ones. If the particular people hadn't been there to do it, most likely someone else would have. [13]

Albert's ‘more basic factors' include ‘the dynamics of bureaucracy,' ‘the role of subservience to class, race, and gender interests,' ‘industry and larger societal pressures,' ‘socialization,' and other ‘political, social, and economic forms.' [14] Exactly how or why such ‘factors' are more basic than the human actors in conspiracies is not discussed. Rather, he posits institutions as ‘basic,' with individuals ‘not ignored' but ‘moved' to the role of institutional, interchangeable actors. (If Hitler had not been there, Josef Blow would have stepped in.) "An institutional approach will mention the actions of these actors as evidence, but will highlight the corporate and ideological pressures giving rise to those influences." [15] "Organizational, motivational, and behavioral implications of institutions gain most attention. Particular people, while not becoming mere ciphers, are not accorded priority as causal agents." [16]

The last quotation also illustrates that Albert anthropomorphizes institutions, with ‘motivational and behavioral' attributes. Institutions are human-like. Thus it is not necessary to focus on the actual humans in the institutions. While perhaps so obvious and basic that Albert feels no need to comment, he does not make the point that to change human-like institutions requires intervention by human actors. He also ignores that institutions have no way to change themselves. Albert criticizes conspiracy theorists for pointing at specific actors; he also removes substantially all the actors' ‘priority as causal agents' from institutions. While Albert does not go quite this far, exactly how institutions are to be changed is not discussed.

Institutions exist. Whenever they have sufficient impact on events, developing an institutional theory makes sense. However, when an event arises from a unique conjuncture of particular people and opportunities, while institutions undoubtedly play a role, it may not be generalizable and an institutional theory may be out of place or even impossible to construct. [17]

Translated: when a particular person or persons use a ‘unique conjuncture of particular people and opportunities' to act, institutional theory is out the window. In this instance institutions become the tools of particular people and opportunities. Albert waffles even here; continuing:

Institutional theories may or may not identify real relationships with real influence on the events they explain. Institutional theories:

(a) Claim that the normal operations of some institutions generate the behaviors and motivations leading to the events in question. [18]

Albert does not say what theory to use when some institutions do not fit with the institutional theories, but he at least hints that there is a problem.

First, conspiracy theory is often compelling and the evidence conspiracy theories reveal is often useful. Moreover, description of the detailed entwinements can become addictive. Conspiracy theory has the appeal of a mystery—it is dramatic, compelling, vivid, and human. Finally, the desire for retribution helps fuel continuing forays into personal details.

Second, conspiracy theories have manageable implications. They imply that all was once well and that it can be okay again, if only the conspirators can be dealt with. Conspiracy theories therefore explain ills without forcing us to disavow society's underlying institutions. They allow us to admit horrors, and express our indignation and anger without rejecting the basic norms of society. We can even confine our anger to the most blatant perpetrators. That government official or corporate lawyer is bad, but many others are good and the government and law per se are okay. We need only get rid of the bad apples.

All this is convenient and seductive. We can reject specific candidates but not government, specific CEOs but not capitalism, specific writers, editors, and even owners, but not all mainstream media. We reject some manipulators, but not society's basic institutions. We can, therefore, continue to appeal to the institutions for recognition, status, or payment.

Third, conspiracy theory provides an easy and quick outlet for pent-up passions withheld from targets that seem unassailable or that might strike back. This is conspiracy theory turned into scapegoat theory. [19]

Notice the emphasis by Albert upon emotive reasons, accounting for most of the italicized words. There is relatively little reason in his reasons. While early in his essay he states that conspiracy theory is a hypothesis, here we see seduction, mystery, pent-up passions, and drama—all highly subjective, with no validation offered. Rational, thoughtful conspiracy theorists are defined away. Further, leftists are making a grave error by studying conspiracies, for conspiracists automatically accept extant institutions as made of flawless whole cloth, lamenting only that deviant actors don't play by the rules. Also, conspiracy theorists are mired in an idyllic past, to which they want us all to return. Leftists should not be so naive. Finally, conspiracy theorists are cowards, afraid to challenge the powerful and instead picking upon scapegoats—another trap for leftists to avoid.

To make his point, Albert turns to two examples of the same event as seen by a typical conspiracy theorist, Craig Hulet, contrasted with that of the mother of all institutional theorists, the darling of the left, the august professor, his highness, Dr. Noam Chomsky. [20] The event is the Persian Gulf ‘War.' Hulet's biography is handled with a parenthetical aside ("a popular West coast and Midwest radio talk-show personality"). Hulet is not an analyst, but a ‘talk-show personality.' He is associated with the West coast (that hotbed of extremism and weirdoes) and the Midwest (stolid and frozen), when in fact he merely resides in Washington state.

Without mention that Hulet explicitly disclaims conspiracy theory, Albert's ‘smattering' of Hulet's views conveniently focuses on a minuscule portion of Hulet's massive output. [21] To Albert's credit, the selected passage does not make Hulet look like a fool, although Hulet's reference to Bush as the head of a ‘ruling Junta' in the U.S. is included. Hulet, and a good many others including Congressman Henry Gonzalez and I, wanted to see George Bush impeached. Albert states:

For Hulet, the implicit problem is to punish or "impeach" the immediate culprits, a general point applicable to all conspiracy theory. The modus operandi of the conspiracy theorist therefore makes sense whenever the aim is to attribute proximate personal blame for some occurrence. If we want to prosecute someone for a political assassination to extract retribution or to set a precedent that makes it harder to carry out such actions, the approach of the conspiracy theorist is critical. But the conspiracy approach is beside the point for understanding the cause of political assassinations to develop a program to prevent all policies that thwart popular resistance. [22]

Had Albert either read or listened to more of Hulet's analysis, he would have known that Hulet discussed multiple levels of political causation and was not motivated by a desire for retribution. Certainly Hulet spoke often and at length about the ‘system,' a.k.a. ‘institutions.' Albert's claim that conspiracy theory is ‘beside the point' in understanding the cause of political assassination simply ignores the possibility, often the reality, that by studying the actors in an assassination plot we can learn a great deal about why they acted. What Albert means by the "cause of political assassinations" (above) simply escapes meaning.

Ironically, Albert's choice of Chomsky to contrast with Hulet is useful, for Chomsky insists to this day that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in murdering JFK. Given that Chomsky is brilliant, and also given that no intelligent, open-minded person can subscribe to such an absurd notion, there is little choice except to conclude that Chomsky remains obdurate on this point for some ulterior reason. Perhaps he fears losing his credibility by admitting that a conspiracy was behind the JFK assassination and the subsequent cover-up. Regardless of his reason, Chomsky is steering the left away from actors as the cause of institutional behavior and instead puts the institutions on autopilot. [23] Thus on the one side we find Hulet with a rather complete analysis, institutional (although not as presented by Albert) and personal, contrasted with Chomsky's scholarly institutional view that is held up as ‘more basic.'

Finally, Albert discusses "What To Do About It." Describing conspiracy theory as "a miasma of potentially fabricated detail from which there is no escape," from which "Nothing constructive emerges, [24]" he then timidly recommends ‘some rethinking.' Noting that Holly Sklar and Chomsky "pay attention to proximate facts but also the institutional context," where ‘proximate facts' do not mean conspiracy theory, Albert says that this is no longer enough. Rather:

Those who have an institutional critique now have two additional responsibilities. First, they need to point out the inadequacy of left conspiracy theory, showing that at best it does not go far enough to be useful for organizers. Second, they need to debunk rightist conspiracy theory, removing its aura of opposition and revealing its underlying racist and elitist allegiances. [25]

Albert does not state why conspiracy facts constitute a ‘miasma of potentially fabricated detail,' but implicitly institutional detail is not subject to ‘fabrication.' Perhaps he envisions the institution as a social scientific concept, with neutral observers gathering statistics and describing the myriad parts that constitute the whole. If so, he forgets the old adage: Liars figure, and figures lie. He also forgets the history of the Cold War, with massive propaganda put out not only by the CIA's Radio Free Europe and their kin, but also by the media and academic institutions in the U.S. and abroad, also often in the pay of the CIA, the military, or other government agencies. [26]

A final thought about Albert: No matter what he says against conspiracy theory, no matter how shallow his analysis or clever his barbs, the common man across the globe ‘knows' that ‘larger forces' are having a disproportionate say in his life. He or she knows that the only way to stop this behavior is to either remove the actors or require them to change their behavior. Thus while Albert is correct, in a way, when he says that conspiracy theory is ‘convenient and seductive,' and also when he acknowledges that conspiracy theories are "often compelling and the evidence [they] reveal is often useful," he misses the basic point—that real, serious conspiracies do exist, conspiracies of more importance than clubs, criminal gangs, or "groups regularly [doing] things without issuing press releases. [27]" The irony is that the ordinary citizen, or an extraordinary one like Hulet, sees and accepts the facts, while many of the fancy academic and Z Mag lefties don't ‘get it.'

Fortunately for the purpose of this critique of Albert and others, perhaps the major conspiracy of modern times—certainly a contender for top honors—has been documented in some 1,650 pages by an insider, Carroll Quigley, who was also a professor at Georgetown's conservative School of Foreign Service [28] from 1941 until his death in 1977. The hypothesis of a conspiracy of a benevolent one-world oriented elite is developed by Quigley in his two works: Tragedy and Hope and The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Clivedon. Daniel Brandt's "Clinton, Quigley and Conspiracy" [29] delves the meaning of Quigley's work, and hints that the conspiracy is still active. Brandt describes Clinton's acceptance speech at the Democratic convention on July 16, 1992, then adds:

Toward the end of the speech Clinton mentioned that "as a teenager I heard John Kennedy's summons to citizenship. And then, as a student at Georgetown, I heard that call clarified by a professor named Carroll Quigley, who said to us that ‘America was the greatest country in the history of the world because our people have always believed in two things: that tomorrow can be better than today and that every one of us has a personal, moral responsibility to make it so.'"

This was not the first time that Clinton had paid tribute to the memory of his Georgetown professor. A few days earlier, a story on Clinton's background mentioned that he had never forgotten Quigley's last lecture. "Throughout his career [Clinton] has evoked [this lecture] in speeches as the rhetorical foundation for his political philosophy," according to the Washington Post, which offered another Clinton quotation praising Quigley's perspective and influence.* A kindly old professor appreciated as a mentor by an impressionable, idealistic student? This is how it was interpreted by almost everyone who heard it, particularly since Quigley's name was not exactly a household word.

But in certain rarefied circles among conspiracy theorists, Clinton's reference to Quigley was surprising. Now that Clinton had one foot in the White House, the conservative Washington Times soon ran an item that tried to clear matters up. Professor Quigley, according to the Times, specialized in the history of a secret group of elite Anglo-Americans who had a decisive influence on world affairs during the first half of this century. Quigley, in other words, was a conspiracy theorist—but one who had an impeccable pedigree as "one of the few insiders who came out and exposed the Eastern establishment plan for world government." These words belong to Tom Eddlam, research director for the John Birch Society. As someone who had sold two of Quigley's books, Eddlam knew plenty about Quigley. But we can't have a Democratic draft-dodging liberal candidate who admires a Birch Society conspiracy hero, so the Times quickly resolved the issue by noting that Quigley wanted the conspiracy to succeed, whereas the Birchers wanted it to fail.** [30]

Tragedy and Hope (published in 1966, while Clinton was at Georgetown) is a 1348-page tome, Quigley's life work to that point. The Anglo-American Establishment (posthumously, 1981) is a more manageable 350-page distilled view. A right-wing conspiracy theorist, W. Cleon Skousen, was so offended by Tragedy and Hope that at the risk of suit for copyright infringement he excerpted major portions, added some useful commentary along with some religious/fringe trash, and proceeded to print umpteen paperback releases of his 140-page ‘review,' which are widely available at used-book stores. The very title of Quigley's first book conveys the elitist message, for the well-meaning men who are secretly operating behind the scenes are the hope, and all who resist them represent the tragedy. [31] So who make up this elite?

Quigley: "In time they [the banker families] brought into their financial network the provincial banking centers, organized as commercial banks and savings banks, as well as insurance companies, to form all of these into a single financial system on an international scale which manipulated the quantity and flow of money so that they were able to influence, if not control, governments on one side and industries on the other." "The greatest of the dynasties, of course, were the descendants of Meyer Amschel Rothschild (1743-1812) of Frankfort... [Others] include Baring, Lazard, Erlanger, Warburg, Schroder, Selingman, the Speyers, Mirabaud, Mallet, Fould, and above all Rothschild and Morgan." [32] Even Skousen notes that "this was by no means a Jewish monopoly" or "conspiracy." [33] Further, Quigley cites the founding of the Bank of England in 1694 as a key date, well before Rothschild was born. Of more interest and importance, however, is the role of Cecil Rhodes and other later members.

Quigley describes Anglo-American modern history as beginning in 1870, when John Ruskin was named to a chair at Oxford. Ruskin was a Platonist, who propounded the acceptance of a three-level structure of society: the ruling class, the military class, and the worker class. People were born with either gold, silver, or copper in their souls, the three castes/classes respectively, and of course only the ‘gold' could determine who would be in each. Plato's concept of the philosopher-king was included—a wise and fair ruler who knew what was best for all in the society. Not surprisingly, in the late nineteenth-century era of Kipling and the British Empire, the followers of Ruskin, a subset of the English elite, were told that they "were in the possession of a magnificent tradition of education, beauty, rule of law, freedom, decency, and self-discipline but that this tradition could not be saved and did not deserve to be saved, unless it could be extended to the lower classes in England itself and to the non-English masses throughout the world." [34] That is, their responsibility was to save themselves by saving the world.

Cecil Rhodes copied Ruskin's inaugural lecture out in longhand and kept it with him for 30 years. Rhodes ended up monopolizing the diamond mines of South Africa, and poured enormous amounts of money into ‘mysterious purposes.' In 1891 Rhodes and an associate, William Stead, ‘an ardent social reformer,' founded a secret society "of which Rhodes had been dreaming for sixteen years." [35] Upon Rhodes' death in 1902, he "left part of his great fortune to found the Rhodes Scholarships at Oxford in order to spread the English ruling class tradition throughout the English-speaking world as Ruskin had wanted." [36] After Rhodes' death, the secret society surfaced somewhat, becoming the Round Table Organization. Two other public entities came into being shortly after World War I—the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in England and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in the U.S., both of which Quigley ties to the Round Table. Similarly, and without going into detail, in the United States J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller were involved with international banking interests as well as building their own extraordinarily complex domestic empires, making them part of the broader Anglo-American Establishment.

... Almost all of the 3,000 members of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) will go on record ridiculing any of the conspiracy theories that, according to all polls, are taken seriously by large majorities of average people. CFR member Daniel Schorr will tell you again and again that Oswald was a lone nut, and CFR member Steven Emerson will write article after article debunking Pan Am 103 and October Surprise theories. It's not that people in high places [don't / sic] know better, it's simply that they have more to protect and cannot afford to be candid. [37]

As new research is published about the JFK assassination, for example, it becomes clear that virtually all the high-level players, from LBJ on down, assumed it was a conspiracy from the moment the shots were fired. It took until recently for dedicated researchers to dig this fact out. But thirty years later many journalists still find it useful to defend the Warren Commission or belittle its critics. [38]

Brandt rejects the naive conspiracy theory, which grants omnipotence to a single small group. He cites Carl Oglesby to make this point. Oglesby:

Am I borrowing on Quigley then to say with the far right that this one conspiracy [the Round Table] rules the world? The arguments for a conspiracy theory are indeed often dismissed on the grounds that no one conspiracy could possibly control everything. But that is not what this theory sets out to show. Quigley is not saying that modern history is the invention of an esoteric cabal designing events omnipotently to suit its ends. The implicit claim, on the contrary, is that a multitude of conspiracies contend in the night. Clandestinism is not the usage of a handful of rogues, it is a formalized practice of an entire class in which a thousand hands spontaneously join.

Conspiracy is the normal continuation of normal politics by normal means. [39]

Brandt, too, critiqued Michael Albert's article, adding that Albert is editor of Z Magazine and "a Domhoffian ‘structuralist,' who has attempted to finesse this [the JFK assassination] problem. His [Albert's] argument on the JFK assassination, as best I [Brandt] can understand it, goes something like this:"

JFK was a predictable product of established institutions; these institutions wanted a war in Vietnam; it's inconceivable that JFK would have disagreed with this because his behavior was determined (that is, he could not have changed his mind), and therefore, the assassination of JFK, conspiracy or not, made no difference to our history and is unimportant. The problem with Albert's approach is that he's fairly close to vulgar Marxism, which by now has been thoroughly discredited." [40]

Brandt, in his overall excellent must-read article, discusses several other conspiracy theorists and critics from the left and right. The list includes conspiracy critics Daniel Schorr, Steven Emerson, William Domhoff, Erwin Knoll, Chip Berlet, Dennis King, and the ADL. In addition to Quigley and Skousen, three other right-wing conspiracy theorists are treated briefly—Lloyd Miller, Lyndon LaRouche, and Christian fundamentalist Pat Robertson. Holly Sklar, editor of and contributor to Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management, is cited in the footnotes, along with several contributors, but no left/progressive authors other than Carl Oglesby are mentioned in the body of Brandt's work. Daniel Brandt appears to be a lonely leftist, way out on a limb.

The dog's tail is made up of various secretive and highly organized elite forces and groups. Brandt cites numerous examples of leftist connections with the CIA, CFR, etc. For example, Brandt notes that Erwin Knoll, the recently deceased and greatly lamented editor of The Progressive, had three members of the CFR on his advisory board. He depicts Domhoff as wedded to conventional sociology—refusing to look beyond institutional and structural forces. (Sociologist C. Wright Mills, who wrote The Power Elite, didn't go any further.) Brandt says that "Gloria Steinem and congressman Allard Lowenstein both had major CIA connections. Lowenstein was president of the National Student Association, which was funded by the CIA... ... He and another NSA officer, Sam Brown, were key organizers behind the 1969 Vietnam Moratorium. (In 1977 Brown became the director of ACTION under Jimmy Carter...)" [41] Chip Berlet, Dennis King, and the Anti-Defamation League are portrayed as tending to dismiss right-wingers, particularly Lyndon LaRouche, as using conspiracy theories as code words for Jews and an international banking plot—making anything they say wrong. For Berlet he adds another astute observation: Berlet "berates unwitting leftists for falling prey to conspiracy theories that the devious right has conspired to foist on them. [42] He isn't critical of conspiracy thinking on the basis of the evidence, but waits until the theorist can be shown to have incorrect political associations." That is, guilty of P-unC! Steven Emerson and Daniel Schorr, both CFR members, are regularly trotted out (in the name of ‘media balance') to debunk conspiracies. In short, based on one or more of P-C attitudes, professional defensiveness, tainted connections of the conspiracy proponents, and personal benefit, the critics dismiss conspiracy theories and left-wingers usually deny their validity.

The slipperiness of the conspiracy slope—but inclining away from conspiracy theory—may be seen in Brandt's reference to J. William Fulbright, in whose office Clinton was working while the senior senator from Arkansas was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Fulbright, a former Rhodes Scholar, began criticizing the CIA and Vietnam policy in 1966. Brandt mentions no basis for suspicion of some deeper politics at work. Rather, he says: "Between Quigley and his Georgetown connections, Fulbright and his Rhodes Trust connections, and Clinton's keen interest in his own political power, it's not surprising that the big, bearded, amiable Clinton became a Rhodes Scholar in 1968 and went off to spend two years at Oxford." [43] Brandt does not speculate as to what Clinton may have learned from whom at Oxford. Yet Brandt does mention that "while governor, Clinton was aware that an airfield in Mena, Arkansas played a major role in secret contra logistics involving gun and drug running," and Brandt notes alleged "cover-ups by both state and federal agencies," but does not specify the various hypotheses about these cover-ups. [44]

Rather than open Pandora's conspiracy jar, Brandt turns to personal experience—a thumbnail sketch of 1960s history—and simple opportunism to explain away Clinton's proximity to the Round Table, the Rhodes Trust, and subsequent referral to Quigley. As Brandt states, correctly I think, "In 1969 everything suddenly changed." After the murders of RFK and MLK, along with Eugene McCarthy's presidential bid, there was a shift among baby-boomers and college students away from supporting the Vietnam War. Brandt refers to Sam Hurst, an "articulate and good-looking student body president who sat on the edge of the stage and rode into power on the post-1968 wave. It's my euphemism for slick, well-disguised self-interest and a great head of hair." [45] Clinton, a Hurst clone, merely sensed the shift and fell in step. Lest I be said to overstate, Brandt says:

Bill Clinton is even slicker than Sam Hurst. His anti-war activism, as well as everything else he did, developed from a focused interest in his own future. After 1968 it would have been unthinkable for Clinton to ignore the anti-war movement and face political obsolescence—not because of his revulsion over carpet bombing, but because it was time to hedge his bets. Clinton is not an intellectual, he's merely very clever. A clever person can manipulate his environment, while an intellectual can project beyond it and, for example, identify with the suffering of the Vietnamese people. But this involves some risk, whereas power politics is the art of pursuing the possible and minimizing this risk.

Almost everything that happened to the student movement is best explained without conspiracy theories. There are, however, some bits of curious evidence that should be briefly mentioned. [46]

At this point, toward the end of his article, Brandt outlines the ‘bits of curious evidence,' several of which have been discussed (above). Also mentioned are: CIA links to Business International, which in turn approached the SDS (but was rebuffed), Tom Hayden's alleged cooperation with U.S. intelligence agents, CIA involvement with LSD testing, ‘conditioning' through a ‘behavior modification program' of Symbionese Liberation Army leader Donald DeFreeze, and the CIA's "long history of infiltrating international organizations, from labor to students to religion." [47] Brandt then concludes and drives home the point:

THE MAJOR POINT here is that by 1969, protest was not necessarily anti-Establishment. When thousands of students are in the streets every day, and the troops you sent to Vietnam are deserting, sooner or later it's going to cut into your profits. If you can't beat them, then you have to co-opt them. Clinton's mentors and sponsors realized this, Clinton himself sensed the shift, and until more evidence is available it's fair to assume that his anti-war activity was at a minimum self-serving, and perhaps even duplicitous.

How else can we explain why he has recently embraced the very organizations who got us into Vietnam in the first place? He joined the Council on Foreign Relations in 1989, attended a Bilderberg meeting in 1991, is currently a member of the Trilateral Commission, and has appointed numerous Rhodes Scholars, CFR members, and Trilateralists to key positions. These are the very groups whose historical roots, according to Quigley, are essentially conspiratorial and anti-democratic. A cynic would say that Clinton appropriated from Quigley what he needed—which was a precise description of where the power is—and ignored those aspects of Quigley that did not fit his agenda. He may have read a book or two by Quigley, but he didn't inhale them. [48]

Brandt continues and concludes, providing examples of Clinton appointees and his own view that (a) Clinton and the Democrats are no different from Bush and the Republicans and (b) Clinton's reference to Quigley is "worth nothing at all." [49]

... The new [CIA] director, R. James Woolsey, was an early supporter of the Contras and served as defense attorney for Michael Ledeen and Charles E. Allen, he has Georgetown-CSIS connections, and he's a Rhodes Scholar, CFR member, and Yale Law School graduate, several years ahead of Clinton. Yale, of course, is thick with CIA connections. The new CIA director was close to Brent Scowcroft at the Bush White House, and is a director of America's eighth largest defense corporation, Martin Marietta. ...

It's becoming clear that on inauguration day we merely had a changing of the guard. But it's still the same old team at headquarters, wherever that is, and you won't find any television cameras there. Ultimately, then, Clinton's references to Quigley are worth as much as his anti-war record. And both are worth nothing at all.

Earlier Brandt states that "If Clinton's mention of Quigley in July 1992 had been an isolated case, then one might interpret this as simply a ploy to disguise his elitist loyalties. But Clinton has mentioned Quigley many times over the years, and I suspect that on this he is sincere. Then again, it's hard to believe that Clinton is unaware of Quigley's anti-elitist tendencies. What's going on here?" [50]

... I have no aversion to it [the Round Table Groups] or to most of its aims and have, for much of my life, been close to it and to many of its instruments. I have objected, both in the past and recently, to a few of its policies (notably to its belief that England was an Atlantic rather than a European power and must be allied, or even federated, with the United States and must remain isolated from Europe), but in general my chief difference of opinion is that it wishes to remain unknown, and I believe its role in history is significant enough to be known. [51]

Second, in 1969 and even in 1973, anti-war protest was clearly anti-Establishment, unless perhaps there was a secret Establishment or a second Establishment. Neither adjective is mentioned, both are problematic to a clear analysis. The notion that "sooner or later it's going to cut into your profits" should be run past the M-I Complex contractors, to verify that they were worried that continuing the war would hurt their profits.

In this connection, there is anecdotal evidence that the length and cost of the Vietnam War was planned or known about in 1963. At a conference on Oliver Stone's JFK, [52] John Judge offered the following:

Mother worked for 25 years in the Personnel Office of the U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Her job was to project overall national draft figures for five years in advance for the national selective service call, to within one hundred people in accuracy. Before Kennedy's death, she knew from those figures and projections that the Pentagon was planning on troop withdrawal from Vietnam. In late November, she knew Kennedy was pulling out of Vietnam based on her projected figures. I asked her, after she had been retired, when did they tell her that they would escalate in Vietnam? The Pentagon told her in late November of 1963, the Monday following the [JFK] assassination. She couldn't believe the figures. She took them back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for query—what must have been the first civilian protest of the war. She said, "This couldn't be right." The Joint Chiefs said to "use those figures!" The figures on November 25, 1963, were that the war would last for ten years, and the casualties would be about 57,000, and "to figure that in."

Third, the hypothesis that the anti-war movement was ‘co-opted' is highly troublesome, for one person's ‘co-optation'—used widely by sociologists, political scientists, and historians—may be another's conspiracy. Co-optation implies merely using an organization for other than the intended purposes—a somewhat benign social scientific concept. Conspiracy would entail the general ‘strategy of tension,' including such actions as divide-and-conquer, agent provocateurs, sewing unrest, creating riots, assassination, false imprisonment, and turning the majority against a minority portrayed as criminals, deviants, and revolutionaries.

If John Judge's anecdote is accurate, the Vietnam War only had a shelf life of ten years, by which time it would have served its purpose, with the scene set for the next phase of the consolidation of power. Co-optation is not in the picture; both institutional and conspiratorial planning explain more. Nor is co-optation useful in understanding another example of the impact of the war on politics—the alleged Nixon plot to suspend the Constitution. David Emory [53], an ‘antifascist' analyst with a weekly radio program, has expounded often on Louis Tackwood's The Glass House Tapes, in which it is claimed that Nixon had a contingency plan in 1972 to sabotage the Republican national convention, in order to justify martial law and suspension of both the Constitution and the ‘72 election. Whether Tackwood is correct/truthful is beside the point, which is that the example illustrates potential use of the anti-war movement as a foil to justify a dire action. In this case conspiracy theorists do not see an invisible elite who supposedly were concerned that their profits might fall, but rather see a contingency plot to overthrow the legal government.

Fourth, Brandt says that "it's fair to assume that [Clinton's] anti-war activity was at a minimum self-serving, and perhaps even duplicitous." Self-serving is clear enough. Are not most humans self-serving?  And ‘perhaps duplicitous': This sounds like conspiracy, but is not elaborated upon, although Brandt does refer to "Clinton's mentors and sponsors." [54] Perhaps through Fulbright and as a Rhodes scholar Clinton learned that a bigger game was in play.

Sixth, Brandt thoroughly ignores even shallow-politics examples, not to mention deeper ones. On the shallow end, Clinton was the Bush White House's preferred opponent—so announced in the fall of 1991. About the same time, before all the hats were even in the ring, the ‘media' declared Clinton the ‘front-runner.' Further, Bush's incompetent and half-hearted campaign, and his failure to pour on banked ‘pork' during the election year, as prior incumbents had done, not to mention Ross Perot's in-out-in bid, led some Republicans and Democrats (myself included) to conclude that Bush did not want to and would not win. [55]

Conspiracy Theory and What May Be Done

Eighth, Conspiracy Theory

I suggest that the conspirators are a ‘world class' of fascists. Combining Mussolini's and Harold Laski's definitions of fascism, and adding the actors, today fascism is multinational corporatism, with the gloves off, directed and controlled by a diverse but cohesive set of individuals. [56] International trade was firmly in place by the late 1800s. The substantial foundations of multinational corporatism were in place during the 1920s and 1930s. From Antony Sutton, a right-wing Hoover Institute scholar, and many others, we know that not only did American and European business interests finance an undetermined proportion of the Russian Revolution, they also substantially financed Hitler and Mussolini. From Quigley we also know that the Round Table/Anglo-American Establishment has been actively working toward a one-world government since before the turn of the century, with more than adequate financial backing from at first Cecil Rhodes, merchant bankers, royalty and aristocratic elites, and the Robber Barons, followed later by the same group with new clothes after they'd learned a thing or two about what to say and do, and what to discretely hide.

‘Directed and controlled' by a set of human actors: the great irony of the broader conspiracy is that the individuals involved delight in ridiculing the importance of the human actor only in the case of ‘alleged conspiracies.' ‘Key man' is such a well-known concept that businesses purchase insurance on such persons. Presidents, political leaders, and numerous others are acknowledged as persons who can and have turned the fortunes of armies, nations, and history. Yet when it comes to ‘key men' having the capability of clandestinely conspiring to do so, the idea is deemed laughable. To compound the irony, the primary murder victims of the conspiracy (or interlocking conspiracies—Oglesby's ‘thousand hands spontaneously join[ed]') often have been key opposition leaders, weakening both the left and democracy. Surely this cannot be denied. Look who they've murdered in the U.S. alone: JFK, MLK, RFK, other leaders, witnesses, and several reporters. The success of the conspirators is self-evident: our history certainly would be very different had these key men (and women) lived. [57]

The question that remains, however, is to what degree a few very powerful and wealthy individuals could manipulate our institutions. Conspiracy theory says that a main reason for conspiracies is the great leverage accessible to the few who understand how to exploit the predictability of everyday life. These few have learned to manipulate their detractors by accusing them of stepping outside the very socially-constructed reality that the conspirators are themselves exploiting. Using the old principle that the best defense is a good offense, some powers-that-be have, for centuries, insisted that conspiracy is not even possible—given all the complexity and messiness of society—and that to view selected leaders as conspirators is laughable and a sure sign of mental instability! Ridicule and scorn are reserved for those who say the king has no clothes. [58]

The idea that a lawless secret government exists is not as bizarre as it might seem. Only a few years ago Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) introduced a bill titled the End of the Cold War Act of 1991. He called for abolishing the CIA and folding its secret activities into the State Department and the Pentagon. William Greider reports: "His legislation set out to prohibit various irregular practices tolerated in government for four decades and to restore a sense of lawful legitimacy to foreign policy." [59] Greider quotes Moynihan:

The law of nations, ... Somewhere that got lost in the fog of the Cold War. It just got lost. We have become a national-security state, a country mobilized for war on a permanent basis, and we got into the business of saying everything is secret. Can we recover the memory of what we were before we became what we are now? Can we rediscover a sense of proportion in the national-security state? The task of purging the Cold War from our institutions is enormous. It will require a sustained and determined effort. [60]

‘Various irregularities,' ‘recovering the memory of what we were before,' and the ‘task of purging the Cold War' suggest more than is explicitly said. While Moynihan's bill and views are not framed in conspiracy language, nor as evocatively as mine, he went perhaps as far as we can expect from a Washington insider who bought the Cold War and helped shape it. Not surprisingly, Moynihan was ignored.

In an attempt to address these failings, a cursory snapshot of ‘the conspiracy' is in order. Fish-or-cut-bait time. A few disclaimers, cautions, and guidelines are called for, however. First, a book would be required to even begin to unravel the complex interwoven conspiracies. Fortunately others have written such books, including the best and most recent by John Loftus and Mark Aarons, The Secret War Against The Jews [61], which covers much of the ground that David Emory has been plowing for 19 years. Second, the snapshot is just that, and perhaps a different one would be better. Third, while Loftus and Aarons, Peter Dale Scott, David Emory, and many others provide rich detail about the machinations of the secret governments, occasionally tying in multinational interests such as the oil, drug, and arms cartels, they tend to eschew the notion of a ‘larger conspiracy,' wherein a relatively few manipulators have a ‘big picture' view/plan that they are acting upon. In a sense their analysis is institutional, focused on the agencies of the secret government. Thus the question of who the conspirators are and what they talk about in secret meetings is not addressed. Emory and others insist that there is no single ‘grand conspiracy,' pointing to the warring and competing forces at the top, with which I concur. Thus the overview must include these apparently divergent groups. Whether they are being manipulated by a yet higher and cleverer group remains to be seen. It is possible, given that the overall ‘strategy of tension' makes as much sense for a ‘master' group at the top to use as it does for lower-rung groups such as the CIA to use in pitting various forces against each other, either within a country or internationally. Tension and in-fighting keep potential allies from cooperating and confronting the conspirators.

Snapshot. Perhaps the most important set of conspirators are the Nazis—both those who are still alive and their successors. Curt Riess, in The Nazis Go Underground [62], lays the foundation for this startling reality. The title of a Mae Brussell article speaks for itself: "The Nazi Connection to the John F. Kennedy Assassination." [63] Charles Higham provided us with Trading With The Enemy; An Exposé of the Nazi-American Money Plot, 1933-1949, and American Swastika [64], two astonishing works naming names. Suffice to say that many Wall Streeters and leaders of American corporations had and have Nazi connections, and that ‘neo-Nazi' misses the point entirely. Emory dedicated some ten consecutive four-hour programs to "How the U.S. Lost World War II," dwelling long and hard on not only the few German ‘rocket scientist' the U.S. recruited, but on our placing General Reinhard Gehlen—one of Hitler's top generals—in charge of CIA-Europe even before the CIA officially existed. Gehlen's ‘Org,' complete with some 8,000 operatives, became Germany's intelligence service the moment statehood was reestablished. The U.S. also imported thousands of Nazis and collaborators, and thousands more were helped to escape to other countries, especially to South America. [65]

While there simply is no way to avoid the profound and deep Nazi connection, an issue of timing is raised, for the Nazis did not surface in any meaningful sense until the early 1920s and did not take power until January 30, 1933. Turning to the Round Table Groups in order to extend back to the turn of the century appears not to help, for they were not Nazis. Rather, Quigley presents them as elite social reformers, willing to resort to devious means in their quest for world peace and a one-world government modeled after the benighted West in general and Britain in particular. Further, the Round Table included America's Robber Barons, who had been reduced to two major contenders by 1900: John D. Rockefeller, Sr., and J. P. Morgan. [66] While it is fair to describe the Robber Barons as fascist, with clear international fascist ties, and fair to characterize the Round Table as elitist with multinational fascist leanings—at least in terms of the ends justifying the means, their relationship with the Nazis is problematic. Initially they helped create the monster, but later fought it. The same applies to Soviet Communism. Whether the Round Table or some other group was clever enough to build up the Nazis and then start a war that resulted in one unscathed hegemon, the United States, is an open question, but the results of World Wars I and II are clear enough. [67] As the year 2000 approaches the role of the U.S. hegemon as world cop and leader of the New World Order seems both clear and gaining momentum--with Clinton the visible helmsman.

Thus probably the safest conclusion is that the Nazis were an aberration—one that has not been defeated and remains as a major player. Second, the sociopath-fascist element within the Round Table still exists, now separated from the original ‘liberal' presumed majority. Third, there is the ‘liberal' side of the Round Table, perhaps best characterized as Oglesby's ‘Yankees,' which itself includes many multinational fascists, and whose focus is primarily economic and political in the conventional sense. These are the three main players. [68] So what subgroups can be identified with each, and what might they be up to?

David Emory's main focus is on the Nazis, whom he links to WACL (the World Anti-Communist League) [69], Gehlen's ‘Org' (German intelligence and the ongoing underground extension of the Third Reich), and certain elements of U.S. intelligence—notably the Dulles brothers-Nixon-Reagan-Bush team. I prefer to distinguish this renegade component of U.S. intelligence from the Nazis and include certain right-wing groups and wealthy individuals, some private security forces, and a few of the more ruthless and viscous multinational corporations. All together, these are the sociopath-fascists, who pre-date the Nazis. The Eastern-elite/liberal group, which includes members of ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence), a few members from elite think-tanks, foundations, the media, and universities, and a few representatives from Wall Street, is the most difficult to define. For example, while a few CFR members and Trilateralists are involved, the organizations per se probably are not. Although a handful of international bankers are involved, the vast majority are not. There are no doubt members from the CIA, NSA, and other intelligence agencies, but generally employees of these national security organizations are not on either the sociopath-fascist side or the Eastern-elite/liberal side (the remnants of the Round Table), but instead are typical bureaucrats who take orders from above.

Brandt offers us instead a sincere, naive, opportunistic Clinton, which may be the correct explanation. On the other hand, quoting Brandt, if "power politics is the art of pursuing the possible and minimizing this risk," then Clinton must constantly be asking himself "What is possible, and how do I minimize the risk?" While not a keen supporter of Clinton, indeed while often quite disappointed with him, I often remind myself that I have no idea what Clinton knows and what wheels are turning within wheels. [70]

^[1] William Greider, Who Will Tell The People; The Betrayal of American Democracy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992, p. 23.

^[2] Certain right-wingers like the number 300; the just as arbitrary 5,000 comes from a young woman at an elite Eastern women's college who was asked if she thought she was missing out on mixing with the larger number of students at a major state university, and she said: "No, there are only about 5,000 people on the planet I might want to know, and my chances of meeting them here are better."

^[3] They cited an alleged 1972 Nixon plot to declare martial law, along with the capacity of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to operate the government if called upon. FEMA, including this dimension, was the subject of a Front Line program. See Louis E. Tackwood, The Glass House Tapes, Avon, New York, 1973, for more on the alleged 1972 plot.

^[4] Most reasonably sophisticated people realize that dealing with the Federal budget is comparable to handling a complex family/personal checkbook or bookkeeping for a business, but with a great many more zeroes and no cents. Congresspersons utilize charts, graphs, balance sheets, and experts to help gain a sense of the proportionality of the various costs and sources of revenue.

^[5] Indeed, most insane people who are not locked up understand and accept ‘everyday reality' up to a point. They recognize that to do otherwise will land them in jail or an institution. They understand that to be seen as ‘insane' will be deplored or at least looked at askance, and that they can carry not being ‘normal' only so far.

^[6] The monk who retreats to another locale (e.g., the monastery) is not ignoring reality, but merely changing to a different reality.

^[7] If pressed, most people realize that the rules and orderliness of normalcy are arbitrary and relative. Most understand that they are acting in ‘bad faith' when they use the rules of normalcy as compelling reasons for their actions. They understand that are pretending their actions are necessary when in fact they are voluntary and the rules are merely convenient rationales.

^[8] See, for example, Manly P. Hall, The Secret Destiny of America, Philosophical Library, New York, 1957, copyright 1944, 1950, based on lecture of December 2, 1942. Hall was president of The Philosophical Research Society, which focused on ‘philosophy, comparative religion, and psychology,' including the occult. Hall was also a major figure in the Masonic Order, and to a large degree his conspiracy theory derives from and speaks for the Masons' view.

^[9] Many leftist conspiracy and institutional theorists also say that American democracy has either failed or is flawed. Their respective views and the causes for failure receive limited attention below.

^[10] In order to gain some perspective on the dimensions of secrecy in the name of ‘national security,' see John Loftus and Mark Aarons, The Secret War Against The Jews; How Western Espionage Betrayed The Jewish People, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1994. They describe where U.S. secret documents are kept as "about twenty ... enormous storage caverns, each approximately an acre in size," and note that the National Archives staff have only now reached the beginning of World War II in their program of declassification. They also note that some of the captured files of the Third Reich are still secret, illustrating that declassification is itself a selective process. Apparently much material is too sensitive for the American people to ever know.

^[11] While Loftus and Aarons (ibid.) do not so conclude, a reasonable interpretation of their discussion of George Bush's role as Vice President is that he was the éminence grise behind many decisions and effectively the acting President. They do say he actively ran a secret ‘cell' within the White House—the Special Situation Group (SSG), established in 1981 by a top-secret National Security Decision Directive NSDD # 3. (p. 408) Further, in 1982 Bush was granted the "Crisis Pre-Planning Group" (CPPG) to do the staff work for the SSG. Oliver North thought he was working for Bush's CPPG, but "As a practical matter, the CPPG's staff work was done by an informal subgroup called the 208 Committee." (p. 408). Loftus and Aarons then state: "Reagan had created a secret cell inside the White House, separate from the normal command structure. Reagan was a nice old guy who read his scripts well. When it came to intelligence opera-tions he trusted Casey and Bush to tell him what to do. They were, after all, both heads of the CIA. If Bush wanted a new spy service, he got it." (p. 408) A few sentences later the authors state: "To put it bluntly, Bush was running a White House within the White House. Its members could co-opt, or circumvent, any government agency they wished." (p. 408)

^[12] Michael Albert, "Conspiracy? ... Not!," Z Magazine, January 1992, p. 17

^[13] Ibid., p. 17, italics added

^[14] Ibid., p. 17

^[15] Ibid., p. 18

^[16] Ibid., p. 17, italics added

^[17] Ibid., p. 17

^[18] Ibid., p. 17, italics added

^[19] Ibid., p. 17, italics added

^[20] Forgive my irreverence, to make a point. I have listened to and attended dozens of Chomsky lectures and have read several of his works. I find Chomsky's structural analysis to be both ‘tops' and extremely insightful. My lament is primarily that he steers leftists/progressives away from considering human actors vs. their institutional roles.

^[21] Hulet put out several ‘white papers,' which tended to be facsimile copies of news articles and others' views, along with a little original analysis. He also delivered many lectures, several of which I attended and which were videotaped. Although he claimed to offer neither a right- or left-wing perspective, on balance I thought his right-wing origins shown through. Understating my reaction to Hulet, I did not accept either his whole analysis or set of facts. I also noted inconsistencies. All this said, the fact remains that Hulet looked at the ‘big picture' and was perhaps the most outspoken critic of George Bush's ‘dirty little war.' Also, and repeating, Hulet says that he is not a conspiracy theorist.

^[22] Ibid., p. 18, italics added to final sentence and ‘operendi' sic corrected

^[23] Due to Chomsky's continued claim that Oswald killed JFK, occasionally I have to throttle the thought that Chomsky may be a spokesman for one side or the other of a great conspiracy. I do dismiss such thoughts, as his overall analysis is so brilliant.

^[24] Ibid., p. 19

^[25] Ibid., p. 19

^[26] See Christopher Simpson, The Science of Coercion, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994.

^[27] Ibid., p. 17

^[28] See Burton Hersh, The Old Boys, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1992, to better understand the role of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, which was characterized by a Cold War hysteria well before World War II even began. Quigley earned his Ph.D. at Harvard in 1938, and by the beginning of the war was expounding to Foreign Service aspirants and trainees. Quite likely he was later accepted by The Round Table because of his Georgetown position and the ‘good work' he was doing there. Food for thought and further investigation.

^[29] Daniel Brandt, Alternative Press Review, Winter 1994, pp. 64-69, 78-79.

^[30] Ibid., pp. 64-65, apostrophes corrected/added. Brandt's footnotes: * David Maraniss, "Bill Clinton: Born to Run...and Run.. and Run," Washington Post, July 13, 1992, p. A1. ** "Clinton a Bircher?" Washington Times, July 22, 1992, p. A6. For a more useful discussion of the right and Quigley, see Frank P. Mintz, The Liberty Lobby and the American Right: Race Conspiracy and Culture (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), pp. 145-51.

^[31] W. Cleon Skousen, The Naked Capitalist; A review and commentary on Dr. Carroll Quigley's book Tragedy and Hope, privately published, 1970, p. 5.

^[32] Carroll Quigley, Tragedy And Hope; A History of the World in Our Time, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1966, pp. 51-52.

^[33] Skousen, op cit., p. 8

^[34] Quigley, op cit., p. 130

^[35] Ibid., p. 131

^[36] Ibid., pp. 131-132

^[37] Brandt, op cit., p. 65. I take this poll data to refer to such conspiracies as mentioned in the examples, not the larger conspiracy under consideration herein.

^[38] Ibid., pp. 65-66

^[39] Ibid., p. 67, italics added. Brandt cites Carl Oglesby, The Yankee and Cowboy War, Berkley Publishing, New York, 1977, p. 25.

^[40] Ibid., pp. 67-68

^[41] Ibid. p. 78; also see Thomas Arne, "Feminism's hidden history," Paranoia, Winter 1994.

^[42] I generally with the idea that LaRouche's and similar material is gravely flawed. Indeed, I have not been able to force myself to read more than a few paragraphs and listen to the odd commentary on such views. The problem, as I see it, is that to verify which of their facts are accurate and unravel the whole mess would take a lifetime. They have plots within plots, Communists behind every Bush, and British intelligence running the world. As to the second criticism of Berlet, I notice that Berlet credits right-wingers as capable of conspiring to plant conspiracy theories but incapable of conspiring to perform the actions depicted therein. I cannot determine what either Berlet or Brandt mean in this context. Also, I have seen Berlet's ‘guilt by association' strategy ‘up close and personal,' so I know he is capable of shoddy journalism.

^[43] Ibid., p. 78

^[44] Ibid., p. 78

^[45] Ibid., p. 78

^[46] Ibid., p. 78, italics added

^[47] Ibid., pp. 78-79

^[48] Ibid., p. 79, all italics added

^[49] Ibid., p. 79, italics added

^[50] Ibid., p. 69, italics added

^[51] Quigley, op cit., p. 950. No doubt somewhere Quigley probably rails at anti-democratic and elitist forces and principles. After all, he was holding forth from that great democratic, anti-elitist institution, Jesuit-run Georgetown University. Unwilling to trust a right-winger's selection of quotations, I turned first to the index of Tragedy and Hope, where I found no mention of ‘anti-democratic,' ‘anti-elitist,' or ‘elitist.' However, ten references to ‘democracy' are in the index, along with a note to check also under specific countries. On balance the ten references pointed to weaknesses of what Quigley calls democracy, and included such comments as: "A period that is not democratic in its political structure is not necessarily bad, and may well be one in which people can live a rich and full social or intellectual life whose value may be even more significant than a democratic political or military structure." (p. 1201) Presumably Quigley has some insight into life on Mars, for obviously he cannot name a this-worldly example where the slaves, peasants, and underclasses led a ‘full social or intellectual life.' An example of a weakness of democracy: "The influence of democracy served to increase the tension of a crisis because elected politicians felt it necessary to pander to the most irrational and crass motivations of the electorate in order to ensure future election..." (p. 222) Similarly: "The historical importance of the banker-engendered deflationary crisis of 1927-1940 can hardly be overestimated. It gave a blow to democracy and to the parliamentary system which the later triumphs of these in World War II and the postwar world were unable to repair fully." (p. 357) He neglects to mention that ‘they' didn't even try; and note the ‘deflationary crisis,' though to his credit he got the ‘banker-engendered' part right. Also to Quigley's credit, he notes three basic foundations of political democracy: "(1) that men are relatively equal in factual power; (2) that men have relatively equal access to the information needed to make a government's decisions; and (3) that men have a psychological readiness to accept majority rule in return for those civil rights which will allow any minority to work to build itself up to become a majority." (p. 865) He says "weapons development" destroyed the first, "secrecy, security considerations, and the growing complexity of issues" have undermined the second, and that the third "was always the weakest." (p. 865) But at least he provides us a guide of what to do to make democracy effective—correcting for his gender bias, of course.

^[52] February 1992, American University, Washington, DC. To write to get confirmation on the above claim: Foreign Relations of the U.S. Policy, 1962-63, Vietnam Series; Volume 4, Aug.-Dec. 1963; Security Memorandum of Kennedy's plan. This was also backed up by Arthur Schlesinger. (This short transcript is not guaranteed as to exactitude, although I have viewed the video several times and attempted to transcribe it accurately.)

^[53] Broadcasting regularly from KFJC FM radio, 89.5 (Los Altos Hills, CA), Sundays, 7-11 PM, in his 16th year.

^[54] In Partners in Power: The Clintons and Their America (Henry Holt & Co., New York, June 1, 1996) Roger Morris claims that while at Oxford Clinton was working for the CIA and reporting on fellow anti-war activists to his handlers, which gives "perhaps duplicitous" considerable substance. Indeed, much of Clinton's subsequent political success and actions become clearer if this allegation is true.

^[55] Ross Perot was very outspoken about the conspiracy to bring Saddam Hussein into Kuwait, followed by refusal to negotiate with him. Others noted the shameless trick Bush used to get Congress to preapprove his bombing and attack—namely by wording the war-authorization resolution in such a way that the congressmen and women merely had to vote to trust his judgment. Many—probably enough that the outcome would have been reversed had they voted the other way—expressed their trust that Bush would negotiate before bombing. Instead, he launched massive air strikes on day one. This may be one reason his overall performance in manufacturing and then prosecuting the Gulf ‘War' backfired.

^[56] Antitrust law includes the concept of ‘conscious parallelism,' whereby members of major corporations do not have to actually meet in person for an action or policy to be deemed a violation. For example, one airline or steel company changes prices, and the others follow suit. Similarly, in conspiracy theory the actors do not have to always meet and decide the next steps; rather, some can take cues from others. They do occasionally meet, however—in a variety of settings, including conferences, with different subsets in attendance.

^[57] Of course this does not mean that society should react in kind—the conspirators must not be tried and executed, if found guilty, if for no other reason than often they were operating under the cloak of ‘national security.' But at least we can admit that stopping future such actions by specified individuals would be an effective way to end the National Security State and thus would accrue to the benefit of ‘the people.' We would also learn a lot—especially that secrecy has risks beyond any overall benefit.

^[58] The flip side of this strategy by conspiracy theorists is that what's good for the goose would be good for the gander. Since the conspirators ridicule the idea that a few men could exercise such control, demonstration that they do and then ridiculing them for thinking the majority would forever buy their lies might prove effective in helping to stop them.

^[59] Greider, op cit., p. 360

^[60] Ibid., p. 360; in February 1995, Moynihan introduced new legislation to curb the CIA and appeared on the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour to discuss the issue in almost exactly the same terms as the quoted material.

^[61] Loftus and Aarons, op cit.

^[62] Doubleday, Doran and Co., Garden City, NY, 1944

^[63] The Rebel, November 22, 1983, pp. 22-35

^[64] Respectively, Delacorte Press, New York, 1983, and Doubleday & Company, Garden City, NY, 1985

^[65] Also see Christopher Simpson, Blowback, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, New York, 1988.

^[66] See Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barons, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1934.

^[67] When the smoke cleared, roughly 60 million lay dead, including some 350,000 Americans. Nations and continents were laid waste, with hardly a scratch on the U.S. Global industrial production/distribution was in shambles, but not the U.S.'s. The U.S.'s main ally, without whom the war would have been lost, was so wounded that years of propaganda were required to transform the West's savior into the ‘evil empire' Cold War enemy. See Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, The Great Conspiracy, The Secret War Against Soviet Russia, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1946. These authors apparently were Soviet sympathizers, but so many other works say the same thing that they are referenced despite the potential bias.

^[68] Other players include the organized crime and drug cartels, terrorist organizations (though often linked to either the Nazis or the sociopath derivative of the Round Table), and possibly the secret side of other governments, particularly in the Far East.

^[69] See Scott and Jon Lee Anderson, Inside The League; The Shocking Expose of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American Death Squads Have Infiltrated The World Anti-Communist League, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, 1986.

^[70] I once heard an anecdote about a President's first day in the Oval Office, the gist of which is that after all the celebrating the day and night before, two unknown men are the first to greet the new president, and turn over to him about five feet of secret documents, which he is then told to read and not talk about. Unable to track down the reference, I suspect it's valid nonetheless, and just a hint of what ‘wheels within wheels' means.