My intention is to give a short description of how I believe the theories, evidence and speculations in two overlapping areas of current research fit together with current psychodynamic theories, practice and evidence. The two overlapping areas of current research I will call "Consciousness Studies" and "Embodied Mind and Cognition". The latter is a branch of cognitive science. "Conscious Studies" includes many disciplines including cognitive science and, to a much, much lesser degree, psychodynamically oriented disciplines. I use the word "psychodynamic" because I wish to be inclusive when it comes to theorists and practitioners and avoid the constraints of naming a particular school of thought. I must stress that these are definitely speculations but are not completely unfounded. I will also stress that many of the ideas are not mine. This exposition also lacks a certain amount of scholarship. I've included a partial bibliography and mention authors here but I don't have the free time necessary to provide thoughtful cites or a full bibliography. My apologies to all and to any author whose work I misrepresent or whose name I have not mentioned. Any errors or misunderstanding are mine. I can only promise to make amends as time permits.

I'll start first by giving a brief explanation of cognitive theories and theories of mind based on neuroscience and quantum physics. Our neural system and the brain can be said to "embody" our experience. The mathematical model of how neurons interact and store memories, etc. is called a "neural network" and the general approach is called "connectionist". These theories attempt to mathematically model the "firing" of neurons and exchange of neurotransmitters. Learning, memory and relatively automatic coordination of the senses and bodily systems seems to be mimicked by these models. The "logic" of these networks is not at all like a computer program. It is more like the annealing of glass or metal, i.e., the heating and slow cooling of aggregated matter to remove internal stresses. The "neural nets" must be "trained" just as our neural system acquires experience from the beginning of its growth and throughout a life. Marvin Minsky's Society of Mind contains a series of essays that outlines various formal approaches he has developed. Bernard Baars' In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind describes an overall cognitive architecture based on information from the neuro and cognitive sciences.

Quantum mechanics is then brought in because it provides the physical theory of how the global activity of weakly connected neural assemblies in the brain could be unified when we are having conscious experiences, consciously engaging in thinking or engaging other cognitive activities that that may or may not require consciousness. This provides the basis for creating what might be imagined as a hologram that unifies senses and memories in ordered ways that reflect our experience, bodily construction, immediate motivations and primal intentions. To close the gap between quantum physics and neurobiology, the theorists point to biological structures in the synapses called microtubules that could participate in quantum effects that are local to the brain. These unifying events would cause "learning" (changes in neurotransmission) in the neurons participating in each event. Some theorists have gone as far as to speculate on the minimum number of neurons necessary for an organism to have conscious experience, i.e., to be sentient. My understanding is that they believe that can ultimately use very simple organisms in experiments that would allow them to test their hypothesis and produce solid empirical evidence.

The interpretation of the nature of these unifying events is bound up in the deeper aspects of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. For those not familiar with quantum physics, the predictions of the equations result in a number of possible outcomes each having a probability. It is "as if" there are a number of possible worlds, only one of which will materialize at particular instant. The specific "event" that will occur is not known but the probability of its occurrence is. If there is free will or choice, then as far as the physics goes, this is the "natural" place where it can fit within the theoretical framework. When a Henry Stapp says that conscious experience is the creative event, he is not being particularly mystical. He is noting that conscious experience is all we really have or know. It is only way our whole "world" comes into play. In a brief posting to a discussion list, he says "In quantum theory 'being' is naturally connected to 'doing': what is 'actual' is the quantum event, which is naturally an act by which a functional activity actually 'comes into being.'". The word "choice" brings the paradoxes of free will or volition to the forefront. If the body is not making choices during conscious experience, then we are just machines. If conscious experience is the functional act of mind that acts to bring the body into harmony with itself and the world, then you have a type of creative act that suggests an element of choice.

Some will argue that quantum mechanics makes telepathy possible, e.g., mind reading or other paranormal phenomena. These thoughts arise because the quantum physicist can imagine an equation that describes the cosmos. However, Bohm and Hiley have created an example using planets, and others have done even more practical calculations involving the physics occurring in the brain, that ruled out anything like psychokinesis or mental telepathy. Conscious experience itself seems local to the brain in which in occurs. Conscious experience does, however, seem to present partial but unified views of the organism interacting with the world and itself. The local-ness of conscious experience is the same local-ness of my hand or your hand - your conscious experience and my conscious experience cannot occur in the exact same physical space (without disastrous consequences that would end our capacity to have any experience!) Again, we are physically connected to the same external world through our ordinary senses. Our physical bodies simply occupy a private or personal physical space within the larger world.

A quantum physicist named H. Everett has proposed what is called the "Many Worlds" interpretation of quantum physics. In this interpretation, all the possible worlds materialize but in completely disjoint universes. It is intriguing and can lead to much interesting speculation but, to me, this interpretation simply seems to restate the deeper problem in a different way. For me, thinking about things this way is like standing in a room of mirrors looking at reflections of reflections on into infinity. (A room at the Bavarian King Ludwig's Linderhof castle comes to mind here.) In my mind, the Bohm and Stapp interpretations result in a theory that deepens my understanding as opposed to simply evoking a sense of intrigue or fascination.

While Stapp argues that David Bohm's ontological interpretation of quantum physics is too deterministic and contains extraneous elements, they both agree that the apparent statistical nature of quantum physics is not necessarily random. Bohm's theory postulates "hidden variables" and an "implicate", or implied order. Stapp writes of choice and mind choosing according to an aesthetic. For me, the communicable aspect of this aesthetic is akin to mathematicians or philosophers agreeing when a proposition has been proved to everyone's satisfaction or a similar human collective agreeing to something to be taken as objective truth. Varela, in his recent book, Ethical Know How describes a similar aesthetic based on his thinking about embodied mind. (This also may be similar to what Jung means in the idea that we have an "Objective Psyche" but I would have to do further research to test my understanding.) I don't read either Stapp or Varela as being particularly mystical. Instead I experience them as working at the edge of the unknown and perhaps unknowable. Bohm is a bit more conservative and less speculative but his ontological interpretation leaves doors open and the mathematical and logical arguments are typically unassailable. Jeffrey Bub has a recent work called Interpreting the Quantum World in which he sets out to state the criteria by which interpretations of quantum mechanics can be judged to be sound from the perspective of a philosopher of science. Bohm's interpretation passes Bub's tests. (Bub discusses all the major interpretations, including Everett's, in the book I've mentioned.)

The important aspect of Bohm's interpretation can be explained using file compression as an analogy. When you "compress" text, image or sound files on a computer, e.g., create a "zip", "jpg" or "mp3" file, the contents of the compressed file look statistically like random noise. The goal of a good compression recipe is to remove all detectable order from an otherwise coherent representation. However, if you have the decompression algorithm, you have the "key" which reveals the order hidden in the apparent noise. (The nature of a Zen koan comes to mind here.) Bohm's implicate order is something like this.

Bohm says this "key" exists and we just don't have it. He goes farther and says we can never quite have it. Basil Hiley, Bohm's associate, gave an explanation of this and as he talked, his arm and hand gracefully reached out to illustrate a failed attempt to grasp something beyond one's grasp. This is another way of explaining why the physicists cannot measure both the position and momentum of a particle at the same time. In other words, this is an ontological explanation of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principal.

Stapp speculates "the body chooses" according a fundamental aesthetic and the world of conscious experience is part of this process. You can reconcile the two views by agreeing with both Bohm and Stapp and saying the body chooses as best it can given its level of understanding. It's "choosing" of any kind that brings up the paradoxes of free will no matter how constrained the choices are. The clearer and fewer the choices, the more literal or accurate is our understanding and our expressions of our understanding. The less clear and more multitudinous the choices, the less literal and more metaphorical our understanding becomes and the more abstract an/or mystical our expressions of our experiences must be. We move from "is" (literal) to "as if" (abstract) based on our detailed understanding of the particular experience and, with this shift, the meaning conveyed in our communications change accordingly. This, I should make clear, is how the various theories and speculations come together for me as I work towards an embodied psychodynamic perspective. I don't know how Stapp or Bohm would characterize my interpretation of their work. Bohm has passed on and Basil Hiley, is co-worker, relies heavily on mathematical expositions. Given that Stapp is critical of Bohm's work, I think I'm on my own here and far out of my league if it came down to having a productive disagreement if I had to start scribbling equations on a white board or discuss the work of the founders of quantum theory.

To complete the details behind my views of the relationships between these various theories and psychodynamic theories and disciplines, I need to bring in an observation of Henry Stapp and then add the recent work of Lakoff and Johnson in the area of linguistics. This will provide the way to bring in psychodynamic theory, practice and experience as well as some philosophy of science and mind as articulated and practiced today.

Stapp, in essence, asserts that all we really have is private conscious experience but we share the same larger observable world that is external to our bodies. I will define "shared experiences" as private conscious experiences of the same external world constrained by Einstein's description of time and space. If I write that we see the same sunset, it means that we literally see the same sunset. There is nothing metaphorical about this type of shared experience. There is no thought experiment or hermeneutics required nor is their any particular poetic aspect to the statement. However, when I say "world", I do mean the world described by classical physics and Einstein, in other words, the world as we typically think about it. I am only making this statement because authors will write about the "quantum world" and "quantum reality", which is not the usual way most people I know, including myself, think about my neighborhood and planet. I just need to be very clear about what I would like various words to mean as I develop the next few thoughts.

Bernard Baars, a cognitive scientist and self-avowed empiricist, expresses the need for "publicly verifiable evidence" which, for our purpose, is shared experience. The difficulty where psychodynamic evidence is concerned is that it is not "publicly verifiable" in the way that a Bernard Baars would like. Baars is a thoughtful scientist and is not anti-psychodynamics. I'm using his phrase and scientific outlook to point out that the evidence that supports psycho-dynamic theories is "private". Two people can look at the same sunset at the same moment but no person can "look" into anyone else's mind at anytime anymore than they can literally live in each others' bodies at the same time.

Two people can communicate about their internal and external experiences. The communications are shared experiences. However, note that in all cases, including observing impressive scientific experiments, what is shared is something in the world external to each body participating in what is shared. The conscious experience of each observer is still private.

This makes the distinction of the empiricist a bit lacking when it comes to completely disregarding first person accounts. All we have are first person accounts that everyone may or may not agree are consistent with each other. However, where empirical science is concerned, the external events must also be consistently reproducible. This is, for all practical purposes, impossible given the nature of psychodynamic practice as opposed to the practice of, for example, physics. Taken to the extreme that completely discounts first person reports, empiricism imposes an unreasonable requirement and thereby defines science in a way that is excessively restrictive and conveniently exempts "science" and "scientists" from the task of addressing the most vexing problems of our species.

Moving on, Lakoff and Johnson examine their evidence and then theorize and argue that language and thought is based on "embodied metaphors". Thus, they might say to Freud, "Dear Sigmund, we think with our genitals but we also think with our hands, arms, backs, legs, hearts, cerebrum, etc. and, by the way, our genitals certainly do carry a good deal of weight in our thinking. We believe that the body requires harmonious relationships between all of these parts of our body including our mind. Sometimes we have difficulty finding that balance in some of the psycho-analytic writings and discussion. This may just be a problem with language. Let's talk about that."

Lakoff and Johnson's basic assertion is that it is the common structure of our bodies that allows us to communicate and that particular aspects of our bodily construction are used to communicate particular types of meaning. "Containment" is a bodily metaphor. "Time" and "Space" concepts are constructed from related bodily metaphors. "Grasping" is a bodily metaphor as is "Holding".

This theory of Lakoff and Johnson makes ontological claims. There is nothing "as if" about the way that these metaphors are involved in cognition. For them, this is how the brain "thinks" abstractly. I can imagine that we use the word "resonance" as a metaphor when we wish to indicate that a particular idea stimulates large numbers of largely autonomous assemblies of neurons. It may be much more than "as if" there is a chorus of bodily systems effectively saying "That rings a bell!" Instead, it could very much be the case that that is exactly what is happening at a biological level. Brain imaging techniques and measures of electrical activity show large numbers of assemblies of neurons firing synchronously (at a particular frequency I can't recall right now) during intense conscious experience. They also seem to recruit each other during this process. ("Intense" just means that a lot of thinking is going on.)

Based on the work of Lakoff and Johnson, I can start to think of Klein as using language based on bodily metaphors like "'X' is 'punching with one's fist'" to communicate the powerful and violent aspects of particular types of intra/inter-personal communication processes. I can start thinking of Bion as using the metaphors of the alimentary system to describe thought origination and development just as Robert Maxwell Young pointed out recently. I can start to understand why rather bizarre sounding interpretations would speak very eloquently and sensibly to a severely disturbed analysand or client. In a very literal sense, it is one body talking to another using a language based one something that is truly common - the understanding of the body as genetically embedded in the neural system. Keep in mind that the neural system is embodied by and facilitates coordination of all the various systems including itself and it is, itself, modified as part of this ongoing process. Taking this view gives some credence to Lacan's statement to the effect that the structure of Freud's system Unconscious is language.

Speaking of Freud's concept of the Unconscious, Freud's "Dreams are Wishes" is an excellent example of the use and power of metaphor in written communication. The meaning attached to the word "wish" is used to structure and explain dream contents. Perhaps relying on a particular embodied metaphor to heavily leads to difficulties. Are all dreams really wishes? I may be able to argue it persuasively but do I believe it? Personally, I do have difficulty believing it but I can easily believe that dreams are the road to the Unconscious. Perhaps thinking too much with one's stomach (relying on "gut" feelings) does lead to ulcers because one is literally inducing excessive secretions of digestive fluids. Perhaps such a person needs to, and can, develop or strengthen another kind of thinking so that other embodied metaphors will be employed in specific situations. The seemingly detached or "dry" thinking of the more recently evolved portions of the brain may just reflect a lower level of coupling with the motor and other bodily systems. However, as Damasio argues based on his evidence, the connection with these other systems, as exemplified by emotional as opposed to logical engagement, is essential to sound judgment.

All these newer theories and speculations of cognitive science and philosophy of mind are converging and more or less supporting the concepts of embodied cognition and mind in the interest of understanding and appreciating the complexity and limitations of human nature. This is a far cry from the program of Watson, the behaviorist, with his avowed interest in "control" and willingness to fully discount the actual having of conscious experience and first person accounts. To be fair, the behavioral view has yielded some insight and the movement produced Donald Hebb, the founder of cognitive science. Hebb was eulogized by one student as having, in the interest of good science and to Hebb's apparent dismay, caused the end of Watson's main program. The theories of embodied mind and cognition are often much more aligned with the thinking of William James, who is often cited as a source of inspiration by many of the authors. However, some researchers are inching towards the psychodynamic thinking initiated by Freud. Names like Freud, Klein, Fairbairn, Lacan and Jung are only recently now appearing in the citations. (No references to Bion yet.) Buddhist philosophy, theories of mind and the related practices are also being taken seriously as opposed to being dismissed as inconsequential "metaphysics" or Eastern "mysticism".

For me, psychodynamic theories have always been serious attempts to explain the development of the human individual as he or she matures and interacts socially with others and with themselves. They attempt to provide insight into the questions about how we grow, find ourselves, find our mates and friends, find our place in the world, and help our children and others do the same (when all goes well). Bion wrote much about learning and experience. His Grid was/is a tool for gaining insight into the evolution of thoughts and learning. Freud's various models capture other aspects. Klein's concept of projective identification is about inter and intra personal communications involving human relationships. There is practically undeniable empirical evidence that all conscious experiences we have are complete constructions with many details more or less filled in based on our prior experience. The psychodynamic concept of "projection" becomes a particular type of "filling-in" that does not correspond to the greater reality. "Projection" can be partly described using a spatial metaphor that places something in one container instead of another - one place instead of another; your body instead of mine. It also involves a metaphor of action or movement in a direction away from the body.

Based on these new theories, I would argue that Freud's Unconscious is not the unconscious of the cognitive scientist but it is a description of the way in which our individual worlds of thought and action are dynamically shaped in the unconscious as described by the cognitive scientist. I can describe this using "psychophysics" language but it is more helpful for me to think of the concepts as a description of overall, large-scale dynamic, unifying biological processes rather than a description of the way it is implemented biologically. Descriptions of "Unconscious Phantasy" are always "as if" as opposed to literal if one takes this view.

Bion's work in "Learning from Experience", and a number of conversations in "Memoir of the Future" address the problem of the difference between the shared experience of the "analyst and analysand" and the shared experience of "analysts talking about analysis". I read his Grid, links and alpha and beta language as deliberate attempts to move away from theoretical terms that deliberately evoke a particular experience towards more cerebral theoretical terms that describe processes and inter-relationships. Clinical evidence and explanations of the content of these process requires more visceral, poetic or mythical narratives to communicate the nature of the processes and evoke or describe the bodily experiences and reactions, including emotions, that can or have occurred in clinical settings. Talking about "the mechanism of projection" or "defense mechanisms" may be a case of using language that is causing misunderstanding because the metaphors are far too mechanical and need to be more cerebral to effect articulate communication. Thus, in my view, you need poetry, formal theory, narrative, rhetoric, logic, mathematics - all varieties and styles of communication to adequately discuss and explore human nature. I can't assign a relative importance to any of them. For me, the intent must always be to communicate a particular understanding or meaning to a particular audience as clearly as I can - not that I succeed nearly as often as I might wish.

Varela, Rosch, and Thompson express an interest in object relations but they did not say exactly why. It could be because of a resonance between the idea of an object and a correctly connected and attuned sub-network of neurons. Or, it could be because of a resonance of the PS<=>D oscillation and the "Wheel of Life" from the Buddhist philosophy of mind. It could be both or neither. However, the latter is worth saying a few words about because it is such a central part of the work of Varela and his associates. Buddhist practice and teaching is very much about learning to tolerate and embrace lived experience. The "Wheel of Life" is a careful description of the "having" of experience. I see this wheel as being an instrument like Bion's Grid. One goal of the practices seems to me to be much like achieving the depressive position. Oscillations and wheels are very similar dynamic constructs that involve movement and return to an origin. Oscillations contain a time component so that the rotations of a circle becomes series of waves or oscillations. I must note that the Buddhist "Wheel of Life", as a "grid", covers much more than PS<=>D. Varela, Rosch and Thompson, while they acknowledge their low level of understanding and experience, do say that the object relations theories seemed a bit too closed and cite Lacan's work as being more open-ended in their way of thinking. Again, they don't say why. They just provide the comments, express a wish for a better understanding and state regrets about their lack of ability to say more than they do.

Finally, as far as psychodynamic theories go, Stapp was intrigued by Jung's concepts of archetypes and synchronicity. These are both concepts involving the overall order of the world of shared experience. Varela and Maturana's concept of "structural coupling", or the continuously evolving interactions between organisms and their environment (which include their social environment) also seem to come into play here and provide a basis for a concept like Jung's collective unconscious. Again, I could easily fall off some edge into mysticism here but that is "me" falling off some edge of "my" capacity for understanding. At some point I am faced with limitations and the powerful wish not to have them. I always seem to have some philosophical basis in my thinking and that includes a epistemology and ontology (metaphysics) of some sort. I don't think I can exclude some kind of mystical or spiritual belief as part of that without deluding myself. What seems most worrisome to me, is denying that aspect of my thinking and experience. I may disagree with many things but, for me, that often means I deeply wish to have a better understanding and I'm not at all prepared to try to really have it. That seems to provide the most fertile ground for omnipotent phantasy.

My experience seems to be best expressible in terms and theories that are not some mix of mechanical determinism and the perfect chaos implicit in the concept of randomness. However, it does seems a bit too easy to miss how ordered it experience really is. I choose the two poles of precise understanding and profound ignorance instead. I do notice and pick out patterns and produce symbols spontaneously. Some symbols seem to have universal or trans-cultural meanings. Coincidences always catch my attention if they seem to be meaningful even if I can't describe a casual reason. I tend to doubt if we could learn language and develop what we call science if this was not part of our biological makeup. Concepts like archetypes, synchronicity and the collective unconscious cannot be readily dismissed - if at all. They need to first be understood and then refined and accepted or soundly refuted. To me, they carry meaning and reflect understanding that cannot be easily explained away.

It is worth discussing the limitations of any theory and the absolute necessity of keeping in mind that they are just theories. While I can't readily cite all the particular authors who have demonstrated or made the next two claims, it has been mathematically determined there is not enough "information" in our genetic material to fully describe our biological body. Nor is there enough matter in the universe to write the equation that describes it even if that equation could be written. Godël's theorem makes strong, logical statements about the limits of any formal description. This is part of what is captured in a concept like "structural coupling" and "embodied mind" or "embodied cognition". It the pieces and their relationships and interactions with each other that make up the whole of our lived experience. While we are part of the whole, we can't literally be aware and think about all the parts, relations and interactions at one time. The instant I resort to a logical or mathematical description (or any verbal, written or graphical representation), which I often must, I have to ignore or leave out quite a bit hoping the reader has the necessary background to derive the intended meaning. No theory can possibly explain everything. It is just an aid to developing a deeper understanding of its particular subject matter.

Terry Winograd, among many others, were involved in the failures of the artificial intelligence movement learned the limits of binary representations and logic from bitter experience. They found that the representations and logic meant nothing without a rich context or adequate "frame". They found that it was impossible to fully describe all but the most simple contexts using binary logic and data representations. Hubert Dreyfus discusses this in great deal in his works about What Computer's Can't Do and Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer. Dreyfus is a philosopher who was fortunate enough to be in contact with those who founded the artificial computer movement. He instantly became a critic and a major thorn in their side. It was not until the advent of neural networks that he was willing to agree that they were anywhere close to having something that even approximated what he calls human intuition and expertise. The key difference being is that the circuitry had to be trained and not programmed. His recent paper, "The Current Relevance of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Embodiment", presents his thinking concerning the more recent connectionist approaches. Dreyfus' key point has been that true human expertise requires lived experience and cannot be reduced to binary logic and parameters or other logical formalisms.

My thesis in all this is that there is value to be gained from these new theories if they are considered by psychodymamic theorists and practitioners. I picked up Hinselwood's "A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought" the other day and realized it was at least a life's work to try to integrate everything in that fine work with these other theories and speculations. The best I can do here is to describe why it might be possible to do that and what shape that integration might take. In particular, I'm saying that Bion was absolutely on the right path to achieve this type of integration. In "The Grid" and "Learning from Experience", he began to separate the language of theoretical description from the language that is evocative of the experiences they might describe.

I believe main benefits of following Bion's lead would be a clearer and more complete articulation of psychodynamic theories and evidence. Again, I think that was what Bion was working towards by using more cerebral (abstract) theoretic concepts and terms as opposed to visceral or mechanical (literal) theoretic concepts and terms. Other benefits could be a better theories about psychosomatic illness that provide better insight into what can be treated through psychotherapy and why that form of treatment is efficacious. The same theories would help understand what can't be treated by psychotherapy and why. For example, Damasio's evidence is that if you lose particular portions of the brain, you lose the emotional component needed to make sound judgments. It is "as if", the mind lost an important voice in it's decision making "conversation". Better, more comprehensible articulations of theory and evidence would also help to foster ongoing interdisciplinary scientific discussion and should help in the academic part of the task of training analysts and therapists.

To me, psycho-analysis and psychotherapy are practices requiring extensive specialized training that includes a significant experiential component so that particular sensitivities and skills can be developed. The goal of the teaching and training is to develop a deep level of communication between two (or more or one) individual(s) trying to understand and learn from their experience. It is genuine enlightenment and transformation that is sought, i.e., a greater sense of connection and engagement with (acceptance of) life as lived. Good psychodynamic theories can't provide a recipe for this any more than the theories of physics suggest that an airplane is a good idea. Good theories can provide insight, points of reference and often explain more than a few apparent mysteries. The theories and ideas I've mentioned have deepened my understanding and appreciation of the work of individuals like Bion and vice versa. That is the experience I am sharing with you.

Corbett Williams, San Francisco, California

Partial Bibliography.

Unless otherwise noted, the works are books in print. I have not listed dozens of other works, particularly those from or about the psychodynamic disciplines. My readings are fairly extensive in that area. I have limited the list primarily to the authors whose works form much of the basis of this exposition. Even in these fields, there are many, many others who have shaped my thinking.

Baars, Bernard, In the Theater of Consciousness : The Workspace of the Mind

Baumgartner and Payr (Editors), Speaking Minds: Interviews With Twenty Eminent Cognitive Scientists

Bion, W.R., A Memoir of the Future

Bion, W.R., Brazilian Lectures

Bion, W.R., Learning From Experience

Bion, W.R., Two Papers: The Grid and Caesura

Bohm and Hiley, The Undivided Universe

Bub, Jeffery, Interpreting the Quantum World

Damasio, Antonio, Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain

DeBaene, Stanislas, The Number Sense

Dreyfus, Hubert and Stuart, Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer

Dreyfus, Hubert, What Computers Still Can't Do

Dreyfus, Hubert, "THE CURRENT RELEVANCE OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF EMBODIMENT", Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy. It can be found at http://www.phil.indiana.edu/ejap/1996.spring/dreyfus.1996.spring.html

Hersh, Reuben, What is Mathematics, Really?

Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought

Lakoff, George , "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor ", (My copy says "To Appear in Ortony, Andrew (ed.) Metaphor and Thought (2nd edition), Cambridge University Press.) A copy can be found at http://rowlf.cc.wwu.edu:8080/~market/semiotic/metaphor_toc.html.

Minsky, Marvin, The Society of Mind

Stapp, Henry, Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics

Stapp, Henry, "Henry Stapp's posting about qualia...", http://www.reed.edu/~rsavage/stappost.html (A short piece that is very lucid and easy to understand. Very much worth reading to get a basic understanding of Stapp's thinking and the overall speculative nature of the "consciousness" discussion used in this exposition.)

Varela and Maturana, The Tree of Knowledge

Varela, Thompson and Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience

Varela, Ethical Know-how, Action, Wisdom and Cognition

Winograd and Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition