Marine Sulphur Queen Coast Guard Summary of Findings Remarks

The above photo is from a news article provided by R. L. Procter, the nephew of lost crew member, Adam Martin, Jr. This is the photo's caption: Missing Ship Inquiry. A Coast Guard hearing seeking causes for the disappearance of the Marine Sulphur Queen was attended by relatives, their attorneys and other interested parties yesterday in the American National Bank Auditorium. The hearing will continue today at 9 a.m. ... court reporters and lawyers for unions, relatives of the crewmen and representatives of shipping interests are shown at the table at the right. The audience with newsmen and relatives is shown in other parts of the auditorium. Relatives of the crewmen have attended most of the sessions.

The following is the text of the "Remarks" section of the 17 March 1964 U. S. Coast Guard's summary of findings of the Marine Board of Investigations concerning the disappearance of the MARINE SULPHUR QUEEN.

REMARKS

1. In view of the vast search operations conducted and the debris found and identified as coming from the MARINE SULPHUR QUEEN, the ship and her entire crew of 39 men are presumed to be lost.

2. Concurring with the Board, the vessel apparently was lost on 4 February 1963 on its approach to, or in the vicinity of, the Straits of Florida.

3. Further concurring with the Board, in the absence of survivors or physical remains of the ship, the exact cause of the loss of the MARINE SULPHUR QUEEN cannot be determined.

4. The Board considered many possibilities which may have caused the loss of the ship and rightly declined to assign any order of probability to these causes. In its conclusions the Board commented on the following possible causes:

a. An explosion may have occurred in the cargo tanks.
b. A complete failure of the vessel's hull girder may have caused it to break in two
c. The vessel may have capsized in synchronous rolling
d. A steam explosion may have occurred as the result of a rapid filling of the void space with water.

The record contains ample evidence to support the Board's suppositions.

5. Another possible cause for the loss of the vessel and one which the Board did not comment upon concerns the possibility of an explosion in the void space surrounding the cargo tanks. Hydrogen sulphide and carbon disulphide gases released by agitated molten sulphur as well as sulphur vapor could have entered the void spaces in sufficient quantities to have formed an explosive mixture. The recent history of fires in the insulation of No. 4 tank indicates that a source of ignition existed. A continuing study of this possibility is being made.

6. The Board's findings include a detailed description of the structural arrangement and scantlings of the vessel. This description has been reviewed for general correctness. The structural arrangement and the scantlings of the vessel can also be dealt with by reference to the pertinent plans. The following plans are considered to be in this category and will be filed with the original record of the investigation:

Bethlehem Steel Co., Baltimore Yard Plan No.

a. 43933 Alt. 1 - General Arrangement
b. 44302 Alt. 2 - Midship Section Modifications
c. 44303 Alt. 2 - Mod. to Existing Bhds. & Webs
d. 44304 Alt. 0 - New W.T. Longitudinal Bhds. - Frs. 71 to 73
e. 44305 Alt. 0 - Mod. to Cent. Vert. Keel and Deck Girder
f. 44307 Alt. 2 - Swash Bhds. for Sulphur Tanks
g. 44308 Alt. 2 - Sulphur Tank No. I Structural Details
h. 44309 Alt. 2 - Sulphur Tanks No. 2, 3 & 4 Structural Details
i. 44310 Alt. 0 - Foundations for Sulphur Tanks
j. 44311 Alt. 0 - Expansion Connections for Sulphur Tanks
k. 44323 Alt. 0 - Sumps for Sulphur Tanks Arrgt. & Dets.
l. 44324 Alt. 0 - Sump Arrgt.
m. 44331 Alt. 5 - Arrangement of Sulphur Cargo Piping

7. The Board's recommendation that the same conversion of another T2 type tanker should not be approved is concurred in. However, its further recommendation that no other conversion of this type vessel should be approved which deviates from the originally designed features for the carriage of normal petroleum products requires considerable qualification. First, the acceptability of any conversion must be considered on its individual merits, having regard for the existing condition of the vessel and the proposed cargo, route, and service. Secondly, the objection to the conversion of an existing T2 or another tanker of comparable age is associated with the probable condition of the vessel, particularly the cargo portion, due to age, as much as it is due to design considerations. Thus, there might be no objection to conversion of such an existing vessel if it were, in fact, found to be fully in satisfactory condition, and if the conversion design requirements were compatible with the existing structure. In accordance with the foregoing principle, the use of an existing T2 tanker bow and stern, if in satisfactory condition and properly joined to a suitable new cargo middlebody, is considered acceptable.

8. The Board's recommendation which would require molten sulphur carriers to install a device to automatically record the temperature of steam entering the beating coils is not fully concurred in. If the source of supply of the steam is such as to provide inherent temperature control, no temperature measuring or recording device or alarm is considered necessary. If this is not the case a temperature gauge and an alarm should be required. If the temperature of these coils is unnecessarily high, the explosive risk may be increased and, additionally, heat transfer may be reduced due to the increase in viscosity of sulphur adjacent to the coils. In any event, there is need to separately monitor the cargo temperature since the temperature of the heating coils must be higher than the desired cargo temperature.

9. Due to the high corrosion rate which may result from the use of water or steam in fighting sulphur fires and the impracticability of effectively manning fire stations in the restricted void spaces, the Board's recommendation that fire hose stations be required in the void spaces surrounding the cargo tanks is not concurred in.

10. The Board's recommendation that instrument manufacturers be advised of the need for the development of a suitable explosimeter that will accurately measure the explosive gases emanating from molten sulphur in order that frequent checks of the gas content in the tank can be made by the ship's personnel is concurred in only insofar as it applies to improving existing equipment and the development of suitable gas monitoring systems. Such a system is also needed to check for explosive gases in the void spaces. Reasonably accurate instruments are now in use. Proposed regulations would require such instruments on all tank vessels. Consideration is being given to extending this requirement to freight and passenger vessels which carry limited quantities of inflammable or combustible bulk cargoes.

11. Concurring in another of the Board's recommendations, regulations are being developed for submission to the Merchant Marine Council which would require operators of molten sulphur carriers to provide appropriate instructions and indoctrination for vessel personnel concerning hazards of molten sulphur cargoes.

12. It was further recommended that the results of studies being made by the U. S. Bureau of Mines concerning the chemical and physical properties of molten sulphur be reviewed for their impact on U. S. vessels approved for the carriage of such cargo. Concurring in the Board's recommendation, the report is being carefully considered.

13. The Board's recommendation that the Commandant establish procedures to ensure that Coast Guard Marine Inspection Offices are furnished timely information regarding significant areas requiring inspection and special cargo features of vessels uniquely designed to transport exotic cargoes is concurred in. Action has already been taken to ensure that molten sulphur carriers are frequently inspected, and special instructions have been given to Marine Inspection Officers in ports where these vessels call. Additional inspection procedures are being developed for the inspection of all vessels carrying exotic cargoes.

14. The recommendation that a company seeking the approval of a vessel designed to carry exotic cargoes be required to submit reasonable studies concerning all of the chemical and physical properties of the cargoes and that, when necessary, such properties be given full consideration in the design of the vessel is concurred in and will be referred to the Merchant Marine Council for consideration.

15. The Board recommended that problem areas concerning the construction of cargo tanks and the chemical properties of molten sulphur be resolved prior to the construction or conversion of another vessel to a molten sulphur carrier. Since the loss of the MARINE SULPHUR QUEEN, a continuing study has been made of all of the problems involved in the carriage of molten sulphur. During the recent conversion of a T2 tankship for the carriage of molten sulphur, a completely new midbody was installed, individual independent cargo tanks were designed to reduce the problems associated with thermal expansion, and the cargo tank vent pipes were designed so that the flexible section was eliminated. On an existing vessel the flexible vent lines have been removed, and a continuing inspection program conducted to ensure that dry sulphur or any other combustible material is not permitted in the void spaces surrounding the cargo tanks. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare will be requested to determine if there is a health hazard to personnel employed on vessels carrying molten sulphur.

16. With regard to the Board's' recommendation that procedures be established which would provide the owners, agents or operating companies with daily positions of their vessels, it is considered that the final responsibility in this regard rests with each vessel's management.

17. The Board was of the opinion that Recommendation 48 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, concerning the carriage of an emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon should be implemented at the earliest practicable date. The recommendation is being actively considered on an international basis.

18. The Board recommended that a portable emergency radio transmitter be kept in the vicinity of the after lifeboats and that an inflatable life raft be carried in the vicinity of the forward and after deck houses. Proposed regulations to implement both of these recommendations are being considered by the Merchant Marine Council.

19. Subject to the foregoing remarks the record of the Marine Board of Investigation is approved.