According to Thomas Kuhn, a historian andphilosopher of science, the development of science occurs in twophases. First, "normal science" operates under a theorywhich determines what questions may be asked, how those questionscan be answered, and what constitutes an acceptable answer. Then"revolutionary science" produces a new theory whichbrings with it new questions, new methodologies, and newcriteria. Revolutionary science does not refute the precedingnormal science, but rather produces a new way of looking atthings which makes the old way obsolete. A paradigm shift is notinstantaneous; several generations of scientists may pass beforerevolutionary science is transformed into a widely acceptednormal science. But even though the transformation is gradual,historians who look back on the event see a radicaldiscontinuity.
Where Kuhn speaks of "paradigms" and"revolutionary science," Richard Rorty speaks of"final vocabularies" and "new vocabularies."In Rortyan terms, eighteenth and nineteenth century scientistsspoke "Newtonian," but twentieth century scientistsspeak "Einsteinian." It is not that"Newtonia" is wrong, but rather that"Einsteinian" enables scientists to do things theycould not do when "Newtonian" was the prevailinglanguage. For Rorty, the practical value of new vocabularies istheir only virtue.
But Rorty’s primary interest is notscience; morality and politics is his concern in Contingency,irony, and solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1989; hereinafter referred to parenthetically by page number).Rorty sees the history of ethical and political theory in muchthe same way Kuhn interprets the history of science. I must pointout, however, that Rorty does not attempt to produce a newethical and political theory which will replace former theories.He emphatically denies that such theorizing is necessary oruseful, and, in fact, Rorty believes the development of theory isa misguided, even harmful effort. Instead, Rorty’s goal isto contribute to a new "final vocabulary," a vocabularywhich makes possible the resolution of persistent socialproblems, for example, the prevalence of suffering in the world.
Rorty’s use of the term "Finalvocabulary" is ironic: he denies that such vocabularies are"final" in the sense of being permanent orcorresponding to an absolute reality, although he recognizes thatmost people do see their vocabularies as being "final"in just this sense. Not all the words one uses are part ofone’s final vocabulary, but rather the words to which oneattaches specific value judgments, words such as"true," "right," "liberal," and"America." The precise shades of meaning and importanceare unique and personal. According to Rorty:
Rorty contrast the commonsensical view with theperspective of the ironist, one who realizes that she cannotjudge "beliefs, actions and lives" of others except interms of her own final vocabulary. The ironist realizes that herperspective cannot be neutral, and, even worse, that there may beyet other perspectives, other final vocabularies, which are moreuseful that her own. The ironist is well aware of the irony ofthe term "final vocabulary."
The ironist "is a nominalist and ahistoricist. She thinks nothing has an intrinsic nature, a realessence." (p. 74). The ironist recognizes that hervocabulary is the result of her life history as well as thehistory of her society. The passage of time will likely producefurther changes in her vocabulary. Further, as a nominalist, theironist is particularly suspicious of words such as"justice." Nominalists do not believe in the abstractconcept of justice, only in particular acts which can be labeled"just." Opposed to the ironist is the metaphysician.The metaphysician not only adopts the commonsensical view towardshis final vocabulary, he also "assumes that the presence ofa term in his own final vocabulary ensures that it refers tosomething which has a real essence." (p. 74; emphasisin original). No metaphysician is a nominalist. Furthermore, themetaphysician believes his final vocabulary escapes thecontingencies of history.
Rorty harshly criticizes themetaphysician’s point of view. Even though Enlightenmentmetaphysicians sought to break the stranglehold of religion,Rorty sees then as having succeeded only in replacing thereligion of deism with the religion of reason. Thesemetaphysicians maintained the distinction between appearance andreality, and, like Plato, made the ‘reality’ we cannever perceive into a divinity. Truth exiusted ‘outthere,’ and humanity’s purpose was to discover thistruth. Metaphysicians also believed in a ‘human nature’common to all. For the metaphysicians, this core ‘humannature’ had to be characterized before one could begin todiscuss moral or political action.
Rorty is especially critical of themetaphysicians’ emphasis on providing foundations, "forthe attempt to supply such foundations presupposes a naturalorder of topics and arguments." (p. 52). Wile metaphysiciansdiscuss ‘human nature,’ human suffering flourishes. TheFrench Revolution, the Romantic movement in literature, and thedevelopment of idealism in philosophy led to a realization thattruth might not exist ‘out there’ after all, and thatthere might be as many ‘human natures’ as there arehumans. For Rorty, the most important aspect of this developmentwas a change in the way language was used:
Human who no longer saw "themselves asresponsible to nonhuman powers would thereby become a new kind ofhuman being." (p. 7). Thus, a change in language produces achange in how social reality is perceived.
Unfortunately, however, the old vocabulary ofthe metaphysician has not been replaced by the new vocabulary ofthe ironist. Furthermore, "the vocabulary of Enlightenmentrationalism, although it was essential to the beginning ofliberal democracy, has become an impediment to the preservationand progress of democratic societies." (p. 44). Themetaphysicians are still trying to identify ‘humannature,’ and will not move forward until this task has beencompleted.
Rorty outlines an ironist view of language and‘human nature’ [sic]. Rorty denies thatmetaphysicians’ central tent that truth is something to bediscovered: "only sentences can be true, and [only] humanbeings make truths by making languages in which to phrasesentences." (p. 9). Truth, which can only be expressesthrough language, must therefore be, like language, a humanconstruct. The useless effort metaphysicians devote todetermining the correspondence of a sentence to‘reality’ would produce far more beneficial results ifthese efforts were instead directed to the development of newvocabularies. For Rorty, language is a tool, and with more toolswe can accomplish more tasks with greater efficiency. Even afterwe invent a tool which serves a specific function, we should notstop there:
The task Rorty sets for himself is to"redefine lots and lots of things" in the hope that wewill "do something else." The only justification Rortyoffers is that such activity is useful; no other justification isnecessary. If a metaphysician, dissatisfied with the pragmaticvalue of a new vocabulary, as for its truth-value, Rorty saysthat one should simply change the subject. This is, after all,the same tactic employed by the metaphysician who, when asked"what should be done about human suffering?" responds"what is human nature?" The metaphysician’stypical charge of relativism is irrelevant:‘relativism’ has meaning only if one accepts theexistence of an absolute truth which is ‘out there,"and Rorty denies this very idea most emphatically.
Furthermore, Rorty denies the existence of acommon human nature; our selves are as much contingent productsof history as language, and just as language develops newvocabularies, so can we develop new selves. In fact, that liberalsocieties permit the development of new selves is their chiefvirtue. Again, pragmatic justification is all that is necessary;justification itself is contingent because it operates"si,mply as a matter of historical comparison with otherattempts at social organization – those of the past andthose envisaged by utopians." (p. 53). Metaphysicians
Metaphysicians also argue that metaphysicalgrounding is necessary for social cohesion. Rorty scoffs:"The idea that liberal societies are bound together byphilosophical beliefs seems to me ludicrous. What binds societiestogether are common vocabularies and common hopes." (p. 86).Rorty sees this objection as a rephrasing of the concernexpresses in the nineteenth century that the decline of religionwould lead to a decline in morality. Not only did this fear turnout to be unfounded, but Rorty asserts that society actuallybecame more moral.
Rorty is, however, concerned about a potentialconflict between ironism and liberalism. The ironist seeksself-perfection, the development of more useful vocabularies; theliberal is most concerned about suffering. The ironist’sproject involves redescription, and when the ironist redescribesthose things most cherished by another person, she inflictscruelty. Rorty admits that "Redescription of tenhumiliates." (p. 90). However, he points out that "Themetaphysician also redescribes, even though he does it in thename of reason rather than in the name of imagination." (p.90).
In order to prevent such a conflict, Rortyproposes a sharp division between the private and public sphere.Rorty defends such as division as follows:
Rorty claims that not everyone seeks autonomy,but everyone is susceptible to suffering. Rorty admits that theproject of autonomy is an important one, but to the extent thereis conflict between autonomy and cruelty, the need to diminishsuffering must prevail.
Although Rorty seems to believe that hisprivate redescriptions will have minimal consequences on others,I find this claim highly questionable. I am not as confident asRorty that a separation of a public and a private sphere willmitigate humiliation which might follow from the ironist’sredescriptions. Rorty himself seems to feel some unease about hisclaim because he feels it necessary for the irnoist to have"imaginative acquaintaince with alternative finalvocabularies."
For Rorty, the literary critic serves animportant function by directing the ironist to texts which giveher "imaginative acquaintance with alternative finalvocabularies." Rorty himself illustrates this function inhis discussion of the novels of Nabokov and Orwell. Rorty citesNabokov’s Lolita and Pale Fire as works whichshow how the idiosyncratic pursuit of private perfection cancause others to suffer. Orwell’s novels Animal Farmand 1984, on the other hand, show how social practices andinstitutions can inflict cruelty. Both novelists serve a valuablefunction in promoting social solidarity, as does Rorty bydiscussing the social utility of these novels. Although Rortydoes not discuss specific examples, he believes televisionsshows, comic strips and other media also can foster solidarity.Rorty establishes that literature and literary criticism canencourage a sense of solidarity, but he has not established thatreading the right books will lead to an actual decline incruelty. Certainly, those of us who feel sympathy for thehumiliated with be affected by Lolita, but I suspect thisnovel will have no impact whatsoever on the behavior ofpedophiles. But, to be fair to Rorty, a pedophile would not belikely to be persuaded by the arguments of a metaphysicianeither.
Despite the priority Rorty gives to solidarityand the elimination of cruelty, his discussion focuses on theironist’s project of self-creation. Although I believeRorty’s final conclusion is correct –the sameindividual can be just as concerned about the suffering of othersas with her own self-perfection – I do not think he hassuccessfully resolved the very real tension between the twoissues. For that matter, I do not believe this was Rorty’spurpose in writing his book; Rorty is simply making an initialcontribution to a postmodern politics.
Postmodern thinkers have been criticized fortheir self-indulgence and their failure to address the‘burning issues of our time.’ The only other postmodernwriter of whom I am aware that is concerned with ethics andpolitics is Michel Foucault; however, Foucault’s writingsfocus more in a genealogical analysis of contemporaryinstitutions and their mechanisms od repression than on adirection for political action. Foucault himself, of course, wasvery active politically, and his political interests becomeexplicit in his interviews. Since postmodernism is a practicemore than an ideology, that Foucault would be a politicalactivist rather than write about it is appropriate.
Like Rorty, I believe that philosophicalfoundations for political action are not only unnecessary, butthey are harmful. I, too, find the metaphysician’s question,"Why should I not be cruel?" a very strange one. Yet Ialso feel some direction is necessary; Rorty’s focus oneliminating suffering and humiliation is an excellent place tobeing. Rorty’s division of matters into a public and privatesphere, however, is problematic. I am not convinced that theefforts of the ironist’s project can be limited to theprivate sphere, or that Rorty himself unequivocally believes itshould be. Conversely, I think Rorty underestimates theintrusiveness of the public sphere into the private. Unlesspositive steps are taken to facilitate the ironist’sproject, it will not be as successful as Rorty hopes. I also donot share Rorty’s elitist view that only a small portion ofour society desires autonomy. Finally, I doubt that humiliationis an unqualified evil: should not the pedophile feel humiliated?Nevertheless, Rorty has filled an important gap in postmodernwriting by presenting an outline of a postmodern politics.