Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is an effort toestablish both the basic constituents of the world and the way our talk aboutthe world makes sense. The Tractatus contains a metaphysicalcomponent and a linguistic component which parallel each other. Wittgenstein identifies objects as the monads of his ontology.
Paragraph 2.02 of the Tractatus asserts: "Objects aresimple." Wittgenstein's objects are analogous to physicists' atoms in thatboth objects and atoms are the fundamental constituents of the world. "The configuration of objects produces states of affairs" (2.0272),and "The totality of existing states of affairs is the world." (2.04).An analysis of the world entails analyses of states of affairs which in turnentails analyses of the configuration of objects. Wittgenstein's claim thatobjects are simple establishes a point at which investigations of the world mayterminate. Complexes have a polarity in that they may be true or false, butobjects lack such polarity: they (simply!) exist. States of affairs may or maynot exist, but objects have no alternative but to exist. If we only hadcomplexes we could never be certain about the sense of descriptions of theworld. It is important to point out that Wittgenstein never offers an example ofan object; we can obtain a clearer idea of objects only by determining what theyare not.
The simplicity of objects is contrasted with more complex metaphysicalentities such as relations and properties. The linguistic entities whichcorrespond to objects are names (3.22), but for Wittgenstein, a name can neverexpress a relation: a relation is exemplified or displayed in a situation, and"Situations can be described but not given names." (3.144). Since arelation cannot be named, it cannot be an object. Obviously, language containswords which indicate relations, but Wittgenstein denies that such words arenames; only objects have names. Wittgenstein's statement that "In a stateof affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain" (2.03)gives a picturesque description of the manner in which objects relate to eachother. Two objects are not linked by something known as a relation, but rather,the linkage of two objects constitutes the relation. Clearly, a relation is notan object.
Nor are objects properties. Wittgenstein recognizes a distinction betweenformal and material properties. In the statement, "William is ill,"illness is a material property. For the statement, "The pen is on thebook," we can draw a picture of a pen with the pen resting on the surface,but we cannot draw on-ness. On-ness is a formal property. At paragraph2.0232, Wittgenstein states that "it is only by propositions that materialproperties are represented -- only by the configuration of objects that they areproduced." Since material properties are manifested only in states ofaffairs, and states of affairs are produced by a configuration of objects,material properties are not simple and thus are not objects. Wittgenstein doesnot attempt to explain how material properties are produced by objects. Objectsare not formal properties either because objects can be represented (3.22), butformal properties cannot be represented at all: "To be able to representthe logical form, we should have to be able to put ourselves with thepropositions outside logic, that is outside the world" (4.12), whichWittgenstein does not allow.
Properties are the features according to which things in the world can besorted and classified. It is not possible to understand redness before findingexamples. What is common among particulars, and contrasted with otherparticulars which lack such features, enables us to formulate ideas aboutproperties. It is essential to properties that they have multiple occurrences,but particulars, by definition, are singular, unrepeated occurrences. Accordingto Wittgenstein, since properties are principles of classification, a propertyis more complex than a particular instantiation of a property through a state ofaffairs.
Wittgenstein makes the interesting remarks that "In a manner ofspeaking, objects are colourless." (2.0232). Not only are properties notobjects, Wittgenstein attempts to purge objects of properties altogether. ForWittgenstein, an apple is not a red object (we will pass over the fact thatWittgenstein would not recognize an apple as a Tractarian object), but theobtaining of a state of affairs. In the Tractarian world, objects do not havemonadic properties, e.g., redness; objects only exist in relations with otherobjects. In this respect, Wittgenstein is a nominalist: redness does not exist,only red particulars exist. But how can we say that one object resembles anotherif both lack properties? Wittgenstein must say that resemblance itself is arelation of states of affairs, much like objects linked in a chain. If colorexisted in an object, then there would be a necessary relationship between thatobject and its color, but Wittgenstein denies this possibility when he statesthat "Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possiblesituations" (2.0122).
Wittgenstein's claim that objects are form and content (2.035) seems at firstglance to be a reference to hylomorphism, and Aristotelian doctrine thatphysical objects are composed of a structure (form) and substance (content).However, Wittgenstein actually makes the literal claim that objects are bothform and content, rather than form plus content; form in one context may becontent in another context. Consider a gold ring, a silver ring, an iron ringand a brass ring. In Plato's view, any common feature denotes an object's form;content is what is not common, that which differentiates objects and makes themparticulars. Thus, with the objects listed above, they share a common structure(form) as rings, and their contents, the stuff of which they are made, differ.But consider a second group of objects: gold ring, gold necklace, gold bracelet,gold bar. Plato's view requires that we say these objects share the form ofgold, even though gold is the stuff of which these objects are made and wouldordinarily be thought of as content. In the Tractarian world, every objectcarries within itself the potential for entering into states of affairs withother objects. However, once a state of affairs actually obtains, clear-cutdistinctions between form and content are not possible.